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Janis Sarra* Debtor in Possession Financing:
The Jurisdiction of Canadian
Courts to Grant Super-Priority
Financing in CCAA Applications
Restructuring of insolvent corporations can be an effective means of a voiding the
social and economic consequences of firm failure. Key to successful restructuring
is financing (called DIP financing) in the interim period during which the corporation
is attempting to develop a viable business plan that is acceptable to stakeholders.
Canadian courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grantsuch financing.
A recent case before the Supreme Court of Canada settled. However, there
continue to be challenges to the courts'jurisdiction. This article suggests that the
degree of uncertainty created by the courts' granting of DIP financing has been
exaggerated and that the courts have engaged in a reasoned effort to further the
aims of the CCAA in protecting the interests of all creditors and the public in the
continued operation of corporations where the prospects of successful
reorganization exist.
La restructuration des entreprises insolvables peut s'avdrer efficace pour pallier
auxpertes 6conomiques etaux coots sociaux li6s j la ddconfiture de l'entreprise.
La r6ussite de la restructuration tient a I'apport des capitaux n6cessaires a la
survie et au redressement de I'entreprise (appel6 arrangement de financement
pour d6biteur en possession de ses biens) pendant la p6riode interimaire ou
celle-ci tente de mettre au point un plan d'exploitation viable que les actionnaires
jugeront acceptables. Les tribunaux canadiens sont habilitds a 6tablir des
ententes concordataires de ce genre et sont donc a m~me d'intervenir. Dans une
cause r6cente dont 6tait saisie la Cour supr6me du Canada, les parties en sont
venues a une entente. Nanmoins, la comp6tence des tribunaux en la mati~re est
sans cesse contest6e. L'auteur estime que I'on a beaucoup exag6r6 le degr6
d'incertitude associ6e aux arrangements de financement pour d6biteur en
possession de ses biens consentis parles tribunaux. De fait, les tribunaux ont tout
mis en oeuvre pour concr~tiser les objectifs de la Loi sur les arrangements avec
les cr6anciers des compagnies et veillent ainsi aux int6r6ts des cr6anciers et du
public en permettant aux entreprises de poursuivre leurs activit6s lorsque la
tentative de restructuration court de bonnes chances de r6ussir.
* Dr. Sarra teaches insolvency law and corporate law at the Faculty of Law, University of
British Columbia.
My thanks to Mr. Justice James Farley of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Geoffrey
Morawetz, David Baird, Michael Rotsztain and Ron Davis of the Ontario Bar for their advice.
Any opinions and errors are my own.
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Introduction
The restructuring of insolvent corporations can benefit diverse creditors,
including secured lenders, employees and trade suppliers, if a workout
can be negotiated that will ultimately enhance value to creditors. As a
consequence, Canadian insolvency legislation is aimed at facilitating a
workout process. One part of the process to negotiate a plan of arrangement
or compromise under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act is the
granting of interim financing during the stay and negotiation period.'
Such financing allows the debtor corporation to carry on operations
pending a workout, referred to as debtor in possession (DIP) financing.2
However, some creditors are questioning the jurisdiction of the court to
order such financing as a priority charge in the absence of express
legislative direction on this issue.
This article examines the debate in light of the recent judgment by the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Re United Used Auto & Truck
Parts.' The Court of Appeal affirmed the provincial Supreme Court's
decision that it had jurisdiction to grant priority financing. The Supreme
Court of Canada granted leave to appeal, without reasons, however, the
matter settled before hearing. Yet there continue to be cases in which the
court' s jurisdiction is challenged. The question is whether a court dealing
with a CCAA application has jurisdiction to order priority payment and
DIP financing without the debtor obtaining the consent of creditors, in
order to facilitate the restructuring objectives of the CCAA, given the
scheme of creditors' priorities enshrined in the Bankruptcy and Insol-
vency Act.4 More recently, the federal government has announced that it
is considering codifying or restricting the court's jurisdiction to grant DIP
financing through statutory amendment; discussed in Part VI below.
1. Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12
[hereinafter CCAA].
2. The DIP financing question is also an issue under the proposal provisions of the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12 [hereinafter BIA]. However,
it appears as if almost all of the cases have been decided under the CCAA. Rotsztain suggests
this is because practitioners have concluded that the rule-driven restructuring process under the
BIA leaves no room for the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction. Michael B. Rotsztain,
"Debtor-in-Possession Financing: Current Law and a Preferred Approach" (2000) 33 Can.
Bus. L.J. 283 at 284.
3. Re United UsedAuto & Truck Parts Ltd., [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 142, leave to appeal to S.CC.
granted without reasons September 14, 2000, Supreme Court File No. 27824, [hereinafter Re
United UsedAuto (S.C.C.)]; Re United UsedAuto & Truck Parts Ltd., [2000] 5 W.W.R. 178
(B.C. C.A.) [hereinafter Re United Used Auto (B.C. C.A.).
4. BIA, supra note 2.
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This article suggests that the CCAA and the BIA are different statutes
with different legislative objectives and a different legislative scheme for
achieving those objectives. The BIA creates a comprehensive regime that
deals with the enforcement of claims during receivership and bankruptcy,
with provisions for a workout of individual and commercial insolvencies.
It does not address the priorities of claims in the period of an interim stay
under either its own proposal provisions or the provisions of the CCAA.
Parliament enacted the CCAA and the BIA as complementary statutes and
neither is subordinate to the other. To suggest that the courts have
compromised the rights of senior creditors by the granting of
proportionately small priority financing to facilitate the aims of the CCAA
is to ignore the entire statutory scheme of the CCAA and the BIA. There
is a public policy aspect of the CCAA that goes beyond the protection of
creditors' priorities on bankruptcy and that policy has been articulated in
courts and Parliament. Specifically, the legislation is aimed at facilitating
the development of a feasible business plan to allow the corporation to
continue in business where there is potentially greater value generated for
creditors and the public.5
The argument that DIP financing and administration charges of
monitors prejudice creditors is actually an argument that it prejudices
secured creditors. While the argument has a certain appeal, it does not
stand up to closer scrutiny. That is because the objectives of the CCAA are
to facilitate a workout, and are aimed at protection of a broad range of
creditors such as trade suppliers, consumers, employees, landlords and
local governments. Moreover, there are cases in which DIP financing is
granted where the value of secured creditors' claims has been greater
under a restructuring than a liquidation. The argument that the priorities
are interfered with is not compelling, except when courts make an error
in granting access to the process at the front end. The courts' process for
adopting DIP financing provides more than adequate protection for the
interests of creditors without having to grant a veto to secured creditors
by requiring their consent. Moreover, in the absence of a legislative
provision, it is wrong to grant secured creditors a veto because it is
important to advance all of the goals of the CCAA. If only the interests of
the secured creditors are considered, it would tip the balance too much at
the wrong point in the procedure.
5. Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest, Restructuring Insolvent Corporations
(S.J.D. Thesis, University of Toronto Law School 1999) [unpublished], at 21-25.
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Part I of this article discusses what is meant by priority or DIP
financing in the insolvency context. Part II situates the DIP financing
debate by setting out the different objectives of the BIA and the CCAA and
discusses how these statutes complement one another. Part III then
considers the rationale currently used by the courts for the granting of DIP
and other priority financing. Part IV examines the challenge to the court's
jurisdiction in the Re United Used Auto case. Part V then examines why
Canada should not move to the U.S. model for the granting of priority
financing. Finally, Part VI suggests that there are principles that can be
distilled from the courts' reasoning that are a useful interpretive guide to
approaching requests for priority charges and DIP financing. The article
concludes that the courts' approach to these cases has generally been a
balanced exercise of jurisdiction. Legislation is not necessary for the
continued exercise of court jurisdiction to approve DIP financing.
Nevertheless, legislative guidance would increase certainty in creditors'
dealings with insolvent corporations seeking to reorganize.
I. DIP Financing and other Priority Charges during Insolvency
Debtor in possession financing has become the short form for several
types of financing during the period that a corporation is attempting to
work out its affairs with its creditors. DIP financing generally refers to
financing to carry on operations during a brief period under the stay
provisions of the CCAA while the corporation attempts to negotiate a plan
of arrangement or compromise with its creditors.6 This is frequently
granted where continuing with business operations is necessary to
preserve the value of the business and assets of the corporation, preserve
customer and supplier goodwill, and retain employees with the experience
and expertise to assist in a turnaround. Generally an insolvent business is
worth more as a going concern, whether it is successfully restructured
under its existing equity structure or sold as a going concern, rather than
liquidated on a piecemeal sale of the assets.
In some cases, DIP financing may be directed towards an environmen-
tal maintenance program pending the workout. This is particularly true in
the resource industries, where inaction in terms of environmental main-
tenance could cause considerable harm to the environment and surround-
ing communities. Thus, even where DIP financing is not sought to
6. Many of the same issues regarding financing also apply to the proposal provisions under
the BIA, which also provides a stay period and a process distinct from bankruptcy and the
realization of claims. The discussion in this article focuses primarily on the CCAA.
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continue business operations, priority financing has been aimed at
protecting or ensuring compliance with environmental obligations, an
aim clearly in the interests of the public.7
Interim or DIP financing during the workout period cannot realisti-
cally be left purely to private contract once a court grants a stay under the
CCAA. Given that the corporation is already insolvent when it enters
proceedings under the CCAA, it is difficult to obtain additional financing
unless the creditor, whether an existing secured creditor or a new creditor,
receives some priority in terms of securing the credit. At the point of
insolvency, credit is a much riskier proposition than when a corporation
is solvent, and thus lenders of DIP financing are able to extract a premium,
i.e. priority financing in exchange for advancing the money. However,
where all of the corporation's assets are already subject to secured
creditors' claims such new private financing will not be available. Yet
when the court orders DIP financing, a concern is why existing secured
creditors should assume additional risk without having a vote or veto on
whether they wish to acquire this risk. As the discussion in Part IV will
illustrate, at first glance this argument has appeal, but it may not withstand
closer scrutiny.
The other principal kind of priority charge is for the reasonable fees
and disbursements of the court-appointed monitor under a CCAA
application. This typically also includes the legal and professional fees of
the monitor. Under the CCAA, a court appoints a monitor, who performs
a role similar to that of a trustee under proposal provisions of the BIA. The
court has discretion to direct the monitor to perform duties such as acting
as liaison with creditors, assisting in the formulation of a restructuring
plan, facilitating negotiations with creditors, and giving an opinion on the
debtor corporation's ability to meet the requirements of a revised business
plan.8 Although appointment of a monitor had become accepted practice
in CCAA applications, it became mandatory with the 1997 amendments
to the CCAA. 9 The role of the monitor is defined by statute and includes
7. For example, in Royal Oak Mines, a portion of the DIP financing was aimed at environmen-
tal protection; Re Royal Oak Mines, [1999] O.J. No. 1364 (Gen. Div. [Commercial List]),
online: QL (OJ) [hereinafter Re Royal Oak O.J. No. 1364]. See also Anvil Range Mining
Corporation (1998), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (hereinafter Anvil].
8. R. Gordon Marantz, "The Reorganization of a Complex Corporate Entity: The Bramalea
Story" in Jacob S. Ziegel & David E. Baird, eds., Case Studies in Recent Canadian Insolvency
Reorganizations: In Honour of the Honourable Lloyd W. Houlden (Scarborough: Carswell,
1997) 1 at 16.
9. Supra note 1, s. 11.7(1). Re Starcom International Optics Corp. (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 177
(B.C. S.C.) [hereinafter Re Starcom]. Re United UsedAuto (B.C. C.A.), supra note 3 at paras.
13-14.
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having access to the company's records and property to the extent
necessary to assess the company's financial affairs. The monitor files
reports on the state of the company's business and financial affairs,
advises the court of any material adverse change in projected cash flow
or financial circumstances, advises creditors of the filing of the report,
and carries out any additional functions that the court may direct.' ° The
monitor, as an officer of the court, ensures that the debtor corporation
does nothing that would deplete the resources available to creditors.
The statute is silent on the question of payment of the monitor's fees
and disbursements. However, the courts have frequently ordered that
payment of reasonable expenses and fees of the monitor, including legal
fees, should rank as a first priority charge against the assets of the debtor
corporation. The rationale is that the activities of the monitor are for the
benefit of all creditors and thus the monitor should be paid prior to any
distribution to creditors. The courts have therefore invoked their inherent
jurisdiction to create a first charge for fees charged by the monitor."
Moreover, the courts have held that it is unlikely that any party would
agree to act as a monitor in insolvency proceeding unless there was some
assurance of payment. 2
Another aspect of this type of DIP financing is payment of legal fees
and disbursements of the debtor corporation during the CCAA process.
This has also been granted as a first charge on the assets, either as part of
the DIP financing for continued operations or as an administration
charge.'3 Some advocates have suggested that this priority is harder to
justify during the workout process under the statutory scheme, because,
unlike the monitor, counsel for the debtor corporation is not acting in the
interests of all the creditors, but rather is acting in the interests of the
corporation and indirectly in the interests of the shareholders. However,
the debtor corporation needs to have financial and legal advice during the
workout process. Clearly, lawyers and restructuring professionals would
be unwilling to represent the debtor corporation if there were not some
assurance of payment. Therefore, failure to grant the funding may prevent
the corporation from working out its affairs.
10. Supra note 1, s. 11.7(3).
11. Re Westar Mining (1992), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 6 (B.C. S.C.) [hereinafter Westar Mining];
Canadian Asbestos Services v. Bank of Montreal (1992), 16 C.B.R. (3d) 114 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
at para. 29 [hereinafter Canadian Asbestos].
12. Re United Used Auto (B.C. C.A.), supra note 3.
13. See the discussion in Re United Used Auto, Part IV of this article, below.
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The rationale used by the courts for exercising their jurisdiction to
grant a priority charge is that it is in the interests of all creditors and the
public interest, and thus for the benefit of all those with investments in the
corporation, and not only for the shareholders' benefit. Given that the
courts have held that as a corporation approaches insolvency the fiduciary
obligations of directors and officers require consideration of the interests
of creditors, 14 arguably the debtor could establish the need for priority
payment of its professionals because they are acting in the interests of
creditors as well as shareholders in the CCAA process. If there are not
benefits to stakeholders in the restructuring exercise, then the workout
application should be terminated, as opposed to preventing the debtor
corporation from obtaining professional legal assistance. The counter-
argument is that creditors are already represented in the process and that
shareholders wishing to protect their interest should be prepared to fund
the legal costs of doing so. Moreover, there is also a difference between
the courts' jurisdiction to make such an order and when it is reasonable
to exercise that jurisdiction.
Very recently there have also been cases of representative counsel
being appointed to represent employees and retirees of the debtor
corporation. Payment for such counsel has also in the rare case been
ordered to be paid as a priority administrative charge. For example, in the
Eaton's case there were over 10,000 employees not represented by a
bargaining agent and there were serious issues of access tojustice in terms
of the ability of employees and retirees to participate in the workout
process. The court ordered that the legal fees for the representative
employee and representative legal counsel were to be paid as a priority
charge.15 This was uncontested by the creditors or the debtor because the
parties understood that this was an efficient means of considering the
interests of these stakeholders, reducing transaction costs considerably.
Thus while the issues tend to be described as "DIP financing" issues,
they actually touch on all of these priority charges, where the CCAA is
silent on the granting of such charges. Geoffrey Morawetz points out that
there are essentially three types of DIP financing charges, raising different
considerations. First, and now rarely the case, is where the court grants
financing but there are no secured creditors and thus those interests are
not compromised.16 Second, is where the value of the assets of the debtor
14. Re Sidaplex Plastic Suppliers v. Elta Group (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 563 (C.A.).
15. Re T. Eaton Company (1999), 12 C.B.R. 130 (Ont. Sup. Ct. [Commercial List]).
16. Geoffrey Morawetz, (Remarks to CBAO Forum on DIP Financing, 9 June 1999). See for
example, Re Sammi Atlas Inc. (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]),
where 1400 unsecured creditors held $400 million in debt. Interview with Morawetz (1 April
1999).
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corporation exceed secured liability, and thus the granting of DIP
financing does not prejudice secured creditors. Morawetz questions,
however, why such financing therefore does not simply fall in priority
after the claims of those pre-existing secured creditors.17 The third
situation, and most troubling for secured creditors, is where the value of
the assets is less than the amount of pre-existing secured credit and thus
senior creditors are compromised when the court order sanctions priority
DIP financing. I8 Michael Rotsztain points out, however, that where there
is insufficient equity in the debtor corporation's assets, a DIP lender is
unlikely to advance funds without the court granting a priority over
existing secured creditors.' 9
Thus, depending on which category the debtor corporation falls
within, the granting of DIP financing may be more or less controversial
for secured creditors. DIP financing often allows a corporation to keep
operating in order to retain value while trying to negotiate a workout with
creditors. For stakeholders such as workers or local governments, it may
also result in preservation of their human capital or other economic
investments, at least for the period that a possible restructuring plan is
being formulated. Moreover, approval of DIP financing to "keep the
lights on" may also assist local suppliers in terms of their investments in
the firm. Since they can demand cash in exchange for any new supplies,
the DIP financing prevents further risk and may ultimately preserve their
interests by allowing them to recover the cost of supplies provided to the
corporation before the insolvency.
II. Situating the DIP Financing Debate: Two Statutes, Two Objectives
The argument that the court has no jurisdiction under the CCAA to order
priority financing either to carry on operations or pay for the fees and
disbursements of the monitor is premised largely on the notion that the
granting of such charges interferes with the priority of claims set out in
the BIA. This argument deserves consideration, but it must first be
situated in the objectives and language of the two statutes.
1. The BIA as a Comprehensive Code
The scheme under the BIA is to ensure the equitable distribution of a
bankrupt debtor's assets among creditors. It is a debt collection regime
that allows diverse claims to be sorted out in accordance with a scheme
17. Remarks to CBAO Forum, ibid.
18. Ibid. See also Canadian Asbestos, supra note tt at 122. In a number of cases, secured
creditors have consented or acquiesced. See for example Willann Investments v. Bank of
America Canada, [1991] O.J. No. 721 (Ont. Gen. Div.), online: QL (OJ).
19. Rotsztain, supra note 2 at 283.
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of preferences and priorities at the point of bankruptcy.2 ° The BIA
addresses both commercial and individual bankruptcy and is a highly
codified and comprehensive statute dealing with the enforcement of
claims and the discharge of honest but unfortunate debtors.21 When a
corporation becomes insolvent, creditors can move to enforce their
claims through private or statutory remedies. At the point of bankruptcy,
the BIA sets out a detailed scheme of distribution of property of the
bankrupt, and the role of court-appointed officers in this regime.
The BIA also includes provisions for smaller companies and individu-
als to work out a proposal for compromise of claims or restructuring
which will garner the support of creditors. 22 This is also highly codified,
with fixed stay periods during which creditors cannot move to enforce
their claims without permission of the court. 23 A proposal must be made
to all unsecured creditors, however it need not be made to all secured
creditors. Section 50(1.3) of the BIA specifies that where a proposal is
made to secured creditors it must be made to all the secured creditors
within a particular class. There are statutory terms that must be included
in a proposal and the BIA is highly codified in terms of priorities of
payment that must be contained in the proposal. Given the rigid codifi-
cation of the BIA, there is some question as to whether there is any
jurisdiction for a court to grant interim financing during the proposal
process. Although arguably this could be done through the appointment
of an interim receiver, there does not appear to be any case law on this
point. Under the BIA proposal provisions, if a debtor corporation fails to
achieve creditor approval within the specified time frame, the debtor is
automatically bankrupt and the trustee in bankruptcy will liquidate the
assets and distribute the value to claimants as per the priority set out in the
statute. Thus the objectives of the BIA in terms of companies are the
orderly realization of the value of assets on bankruptcy, with provision for
debtor companies to make a proposal to their creditors to reorganize or
compromise claims.24
20. Husky Oil Operations v. M.N.R., [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453 at para. 7.
21. This article discusses corporate insolvency. Individual bankruptcy is beyond the scope of
this paper.
22. BIA, supra note 2. Part III addresses commercial proposals.
23. The initial stay is 30 days and does not require court approval. In exercising its discretion
to extend the stay, the BIA specifies that it cannot be extended beyond six months. Ibid., s. 50.4.
24. The BIA also specifies that the court shall not approve the proposal where the assets of
the corporation are not equal in value to 50% of the value of unsecured liability, although the
court may specify a lower percentage if it is satisfied that the debtor did not cause the deficiency.
Ibid., s. 59.
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Canada's insolvency and bankruptcy regime has traditionally been
viewed as a secured creditor-friendly regime in that the legislative history
has been one of protecting senior creditors' claims, subject to some
statutory preferences. There is a statutory hierarchy of priorities for the
registering and enforcement of claims. The policy reasons for this are to
facilitate the availability of credit for debtor corporations and to allow for
certainty in the assessment of risk in lending decisions.
2. The CCAA and its Objective of Facilitating Arrangements or
Compromises with Creditors
The CCAA is a companion statute to the BIA, aimed solely at providing
a scheme for restructuring of insolvent corporations. 25 The CCAA has
enjoyed a renaissance in the past fifteen years. 26 As with the BIA,
restructuring under the CCAA can include amending terms of existing
debt (such as rescheduling principal repayment), extending maturity
dates, altering interest rates or forgoing a portion of the interest or
principal owed by the debtor corporation. It also allows the corporation
to restructure in such a way as to allow parties to participate, based on
some sort of proportional basis, in the value generated by the company as
a result of the reorganization and going concern value generated from it.27
An application for restructuring under the CCAA is restricted to
corporations with at least $5 million in debt and thus it is aimed at large
companies, complex debt situations, and cases in which there are diverse
claimants. 28
While the BIA is a comprehensive statute with more than 300 provisions,
forms and schedules, the CCAA is a short statute with only 22 provisions.
Where the BIA is a complete code covering realization of claims on
bankruptcy, the procedural framework of the CCAA has been developed
through judicial oversight. The courts have held that its design and
efficacy is that of a flexible instrument for the restructuring of insolvent
companies. 29
25. Supra note 1.
26. It was enacted in 1933, but rarely used for fifty years. For an historical context, see supra
note 5.
27. Stanley Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act"
(1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at 596-97.
28. The minimum requirement of $5 million in debt was an amendment to the CCAA in 1997.
Supra note 1, s. 3(1). However, larger companies can elect to proceed through the proposal
provisions of the BIA instead,
29. Re Dylex Ltd. (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 at Ill (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]),
Farley J. [hereinafter Re Dylex]; Canadian Red Cross Society, (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 at 315
(Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Blair J. [hereinafter Canadian Red Cross].
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The CCAA is aimed at creating a court-supervised process whereby a
debtor corporation is permitted to attempt to reach a plan of arrangement
or compromise under which the corporation can continue its operations
to the benefit of both creditors and the debtor corporation, and thus avoid
receivership or bankruptcy.30 The court determines whether it should
grant the initial stay and whether to extend it, defines classes of creditors
for purposes of voting on the proposed plan, and addresses a variety of.
other matters during the CCAA process. For example, the monitor was a
function created by the courts under the CCAA to act in the interests of all
creditors.31 It was only with the statutory amendments in 1997 that for the
first time the role of monitor was expressly addressed in the legislation
and made mandatory.32 The role was created to assist the court, facilitate
the process, and monitor the debtor corporation on behalf of the creditors
to ensure that it did not do anything that would unnecessarily deplete its
assets. While the CCAA is a flexible instrument for restructuring, it does
have its limits. If a proposed restructuring plan fails to garner sufficient
support from the creditors and the court, then the plan will fail. While
bankruptcy is not automatic, it is likely that the debtor corporation will be
liquidated either through a receivership and sale of assets under provincial
legislation or by a trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to the provisions of the
BIA.
Thus the two statutes have different objectives and different schemes
for achieving the aims of the legislation. They are complementary in that
together they provide a comprehensive regime for dealing with insolvency
and bankruptcy of corporations, however their express objectives differ.
In part, this is because the statutes address different points in time in the
insolvency process.
The CCAA' s lack of statutorily prescribed rules means that parties can
fashion their own restructuring process to best suit their particular needs,
subject to court approval. The courts have often specified that the purpose
of the statutory regime set out in the CCAA is to facilitate compromises
30. Secured creditor is defined in the CCAA as a holder of a mortgage, hypothec, pledge,
charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, all or any
property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company, or a holder
of a bond secured by any of these whether or not the holder or beneficiary resides in Canada,
and any trustee under any trust deed or instrument securing any such bonds. Unsecured creditor
is defined in the CCAA-as any creditor of the company that is not a secured creditor, and a trustee
for the holders of any unsecured bonds issued under a trust deed or other such instrument. The
trustee is an unsecured creditor for purposes of the Act except that the trustee does not have the
right to vote at a creditors' meeting in respect of the bonds. Supra note 1, s. 2; L.W. Houlden
& G. B. Morawetz, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1998).
31. Re Northland Properties (1988), 69 C.B.R. 266 (B.C. S.C.) at 277.
32. Supra note 1, s. 11.7.
Debtor in Possession Financing: The Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant 349
Super-Priority Financing in CCAA Applications
and arrangements among companies and their creditors with the objec-
tive of allowing the corporation to continue in business.33 The CCAA
provides a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises
among a debtor corporation and its creditors for the benefit of all.34 The
courts have held that the workout process is for the benefit of secured
creditors, but also suppliers, customers and employees, and thus the court
will not consider the interests of secured creditors alone.35 While the
CCAA does not have an express purpose clause, the courts have been
consistent in their findings regarding both the debt collection and reha-
bilitative nature of the statute. Since there have been two major amend-
ments to the statute in the 1990s without any legislative provisions
enacted to counter this interpretation, one can infer that the goals
articulated by the court are consistent with public policy.
The underlying premise of the CCAA is that it is better for the
corporation and its shareholders, employees and other creditors to have
the company operating in a way that allows it to meet its obligations,
rather than creditors being only able to receive discounted payment at
liquidation or sale value. The statute has been described as remedial and
the courts have consistently held that it should be interpreted in a fair,
large and liberal manner, with the court considering the equities in each
case.36 In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to approve a plan of
arrangement or compromise, the court will ensure that the plan has
received the requisite approval by creditors pursuant to the requirements
of the CCAA, and that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. 37
Feasibility of the plan, evidenced by the amount of creditor support, is a
key factor in the courts' consideration of whether to order a meeting of
creditors to vote on a proposed plan.38 The CCAA expressly prohibits
parties from contracting out of the provisions of the statute.39
33. Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 at 31 (Ont. Gen. Div.
[Commercial List]), Farley J. [hereinafter Re Lehndorfj]; References Re CCAA, [1934] S.C.R.
659 at 661; Quintette Coal v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.), aff'g
(1990)2 C.B.R. (3d) 291 (B.C. S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d)
164 (S.C.C.); Hongkong Bank of Canada v. ChefReady Foods (1990),4C.B.R. (3d)311 (B.C.
C.A.) [hereinafter Hong Kong Bank].
34. Elan Corporation v. Comiskey (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) [hereinafter Elan
Corporation]; Norcen Energy Resources v. Oakwood Petroleums (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20
(Alta. Q.B.), Forsyth J..
35. Re Philip Services Corp. (1999), 13 C.B.R. 159 at paras. 21-22 (Ont. Sup. Ct. [Commercial
List]), Blair J.; Canadian Asbestos, supra note 11 at para. 23.
36. Elan Corporation, supra note 34; Algoma Steel Corporation v. Royal Bank of Canada
(1992), 11 C.B.R. (3d) I (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Farley J..
37. Re Northland Properties (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 at 182 (B.C. S.C.) affd 73 C.B.R.
(N.S.) 195, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.).
38. Edwards, supra note 27 at 594-5.
39. Supra note l, s. 8; Hong Kong Bank, supra note 33 at 315-16.
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Thus creditors ultimately control the outcome of the process in that the
majority of creditors representing two-thirds of the value of credit in each
class must support any proposed workout before the court will sanction
a plan.40 This context is extremely important to understanding the DIP
financing debate, as it is essential to remember that ultimately creditors
control the approval process and the hierarchy of creditors' claims
prevails in the realization of assets if the debtor corporation cannot devise
a plan acceptable to creditors. Whatever compromise of secured creditors'
claims occurs as the result of DIP financing, it is generally only a
relatively small dollar value of the overall debt, and secured creditors'
rights to enforce are stayed only for a brief period. Both the stay and the
provision of DIP financing balance creditors' rights to enforce with an
opportunity for shareholders and their agents to devise acceptable viable
business plans. Those who question the DIP financing orders complain
that this balancing process is absent in such decisions because creditors'
approval is not required.
Either the debtor corporation or a creditor can make the initial
application for a stay or propose a plan of compromise or arrangement. 41
The purpose of a stay order under proceedings pursuant to the CCAA is
to maintain the status quo for a specified limited period of time so that a
proposed plan can be negotiated with creditors.4 2 If the CCAA application
is filed for purposes of impeding enforcement of senior creditors' rights,
the application will be dismissed.43 If a large number of secured creditors
holding considerable value are opposed to development of a plan, the
courts will usually dismiss the application after the initial or first
extension of stay.4
40. The 1997 amendments brought the approval percentages required in line with the BIA.
CCAA, ibid., s. 6.
41. For example, in Re Cadillac Fairview (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 17 (Ont. Gen. Div.
[Commercial List]), it was Whitehall Street Real Estate Ltd. Partnership, a U.S. "vulture" fund
that made the CCAA application. Barry I. Goldberg, "A Guide to Enforcing Security in
Ontario", (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association - Ontario, continuing Legal Education, 1998)
1 at 48, on file with author.
42. Re Northland Properties (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 146 (B.C. S.C.); Sairex GmbH v.
Prudential Steel (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). Unlike the BIA,
the stay is not automatically effected against the directors, but the statute provides for it and this
is routinely set out in the initial order. The same exceptions apply as are set out in the BIA. For
a discussion of the meaning of status quo, see the discussion at Part IV, below.
43. F.J. Newbould and Geoffrey Morawetz, "Developments and Trends in CCAA
Restructurings" (Canadian Bar Association and The Insolvency Institute of Canada, 1991) at
12.
44. G. B. Morawetz, "Emerging Trends in CCAA restructurings" (Toronto: The Insolvency
Institute of Canada, 1990) at 35.
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The stay period allows insolvent corporations to carry on business in
a manner that allows time to undertake discussions with creditors, to
attract outside investment or refinancing, and to prepare and seek approval
from creditors, and ultimately the court, of a proposed plan of compromise
or arrangement.4 The initial stay is for 30 days, and the granting of any
additional stay of proceedings will be based on the court's assessment of
whether the debtor company has acted and continues to act in good faith
and with due diligence, and whether circumstances exist that make the
extension appropriate.46 In particular, the court will assess whether a
company has worked diligently towards the development of a plan.47
While approval of the creditors is not a prerequisite for extension of a stay,
the courts will consider the interests of all stakeholders.45 Unlike the BIA,
under the CCAA extensions of the stay are not limited to fixed periods or
a fixed maximum, although the courts have made it clear that they expect
an expeditious process.
Thus the stay provision under the CCAA provides the debtor corpora-
tion with a brief period to negotiate with creditors who have both
converging and diverging interests, and accordingly enhances the oppor-
tunity to achieve broad support among diverse interests for the proposed
plan of arrangement or compromise. In this sense, the lack of codified
requirements under the CCAA gives the parties and the court the flexibil-
ity to craft constructive and timely workout plans to preserve the business
where it is potentially viable.49 The success of the CCAA as a restructur-
ing tool has been the willingness of the courts to interpret the statute in a
flexible and purposive manner.50 The courts have held that because of the
remedial nature of the legislation, the judiciary will exercise its jurisdic-
tion and discretion to give effect to the public policy objectives of the
statute where the express language of the provisions is incomplete." This
45. The 1997 amendments also allowed for the compromise of claims against directors in
their capacity as directors of the corporation.
46. Supra note 1, s. 11(6); Re Starcom, supra note 9.
47. Re Downtown Lumber (1996), 39 C.B.R. (3d) 41 (N.B. C.A.).
48. Re Starcom, supra note 9; Tachg Construction v. Banque Lloyds du Canada (1990), 5
C.B.R. (3d) 151 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
49. Sean F. Dunphy, "When No Means Yes: The Ball Packaging Restructuring", supra note
8, 255 at 274.
50. The Hon. David F. Tysoe, "Quintette Coal - The Story of its Reorganization", supra note
8, 377 at 396.
51. Re Lehndorff supra note 33 at 31; Re Dylex, supra note 29 at 110; Olympia and York
Developments (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 165 at 168 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Re NsC Diesel Power
(1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S. S.C. (T.D.)). Westar Mining, supra note 11;; Interpretation
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 12.
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includes endorsement of a survival program of the debtor corporation
until it can develop and present a plan of arrangement.52
However, the lack of legislative direction on the question of priority or
DIP financing during the stay period has resulted in disputes about the
scope and process of granting that funding during the workout period.
The courts have held that the statutory restructuring scheme contemplates
that the rights and remedies of various creditors might be temporarily
sacrificed in an effort to serve a "greater good" by delaying the collection
of debt and allowing a plan of arrangement to proceed. 3
III. The Granting of Priority Financing: The Courts' Rationale
The courts have interpreted their equitable or inherent jurisdiction as
including the ability to order DIP financing to allow corporations to
continue operating during the stay period under the CCAA4.5 They have
also determined that they have jurisdiction to order administration
charges to facilitate the objectives of the CCAA, specifically a monitor's
legal and professional fees to carry out its statutory duties and to assist in
the negotiation of a plan of arrangement or compromise. Generally courts
have determined that the jurisdiction for making both types of orders rests
on a court's inherent jurisdiction to make orders that advance the
objectives of the CCAA.
The granting of DIP financing can result in a compromise of creditors'
traditional rights. 55 Prior to the development of DIP financing, debtor
corporations required the financial support of operating lenders to carry
on business during the restructuring process. 6 This enhanced
accountability because the debtor corporation needed the support of the
operating lender to finance operations during the period in which it was
attempting to develop a plan. Geoffrey Morawetz has observed that early
52. Re Dylex, ibid. at 110.
53. lcor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1989), 102 A.R. 161 at 165
(Q.B.).
54. Re United UsedAuto (B.C. C.A.), supra note 3; Canadian Asbestos, supra note 11 at para.
31. The courts also grant DIP financing under BIA proposal provisions. A few CCAA cases also
refer to "GAR" funding, "general, administrative and restructuring" funding. These terms are
in part interchangeable, although arguably DIP financing is a more inclusive term because it
relates to financing beyond that required to actually restructure. See for example, Re Olympia
& York Developments (1996), 38 C.B.R. (3d) 309 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Re Bramalea Inc. (1 March
1995), Toronto RE5055/95 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
55. See for example: Re Dylex (23 January 1995), Toronto B-4/95 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Houlden
J. A.; Re The T. Eaton Company (27 February 1997), Toronto RE-7483/97 (Ont. Gen. Div.),
Houlden J. A.; Re Skydome Corporation, Skydome Food Services and SAI Subco (27
November 1998), Toronto 98-CL-3179 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Blair J..
56. Geoffrey Morawetz, "The Canadian Version of DIP Financing", Houlden and Morawetz
On-Line Newsletter (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 1.
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Canadian cases of DIP financing did not address jurisdictional issues
because the financing charge did not jeopardize the pre-insolvency
ranking of secured credit or because the financing was obtained with the
consent of other secured creditors. 7 It was not until courts began to grant
such financing where there was not unanimous consent of secured
creditors or where there was some interference in priorities that they were
faced with the question of the limits of their inherent jurisdiction to grant
such financing. Then issues ofjurisdiction, including the tension between
federal insolvency legislation and provincial property legislation, became
highlighted.58
It is helpful to note that there had been criticism that preserving the
status quo during the stay period required that lenders of operating capital
continue lending.59 To address this, the CCAA was amended in 1997 to
specify that the effect of a stay order does not require the further advance
of money or credit.6° The amendments also made clear that the stay did
not have the effect of prohibiting a party from requiring immediate
payment for any goods, services or use of leased or licensed property
provided after the order is made.6' The legislation remained silent,
however, on the question of the courts' jurisdiction to grant priority and
DIP financing. Given that the courts had been exercising theirjurisdiction
to grant such financing prior to the amendments, arguably one could
conclude that Parliament was not discontent with the current exercise of
the courts' jurisdiction to grant such financing. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal in Re United UsedAuto noted this in upholding the first
charge for the monitor's fees and disbursements, finding that the only
reasonable conclusion was the legislators were aware of the courts'
general jurisdiction and assumed that jurisdiction remained available
except as inconsistent with the CCAA. 62
1. The Exercise of Inherent or Equitable Jurisdiction
Courts have in a number of cases granted priority or DIP financing to a
debtor corporation to allow it to carry on business pending the development
of a plan. They have found authority for granting super-priority of this
financing in their inherent jurisdiction, and in theirjurisdiction under the
57. Ibid. at 2.
58. Morawetz points out that for existing secured creditors that believed they had a first or
second registered charge over certain property as set out in provincial legislation, the notion
that priority could be altered by the granting of DIP financing was problematic. Ibid. at 1.
59. Ibid. at 35.
60. Supra note 1, s. 11.3.
61. Ibid.
62. Re United UsedAuto (B.C. C.A.), supra note 3 at para. 15.
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CCAA, the BIA and other statutes. 63 Judges have tended to use the terms
"inherentjurisdiction" and "equitable jurisdiction" interchangeably. One
question is whether these are different notions or merely a distinction
without a difference. The language needs to be unpacked. A careful
reading of the courts' reasoning illustrates that they rely on their inherent
jurisdiction to deal with issues of fairness of the process, and based on
principles of equity to grant substantive extraordinary remedies so as to
give effect to the aims of the legislation.
"Inherent jurisdiction" has been defined as the exercise of those
powers that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice.64
Canadian provincial superior courts are courts of inherent jurisdiction.65
Inherentjurisdiction is a "residual source of powers, which the court may
draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in
particular, to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent
improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to
secure a fair trial between them". 66 While Halsbury's has characterized
inherent jurisdiction as procedural rather than substantive law, the
Supreme Court of Canada has not followed this reasoning, and has
accorded it both a substantive and procedural meaning.67
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the notions of inherent
jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction are cumulative, not mutually
exclusive. 68 A court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction in respect of
matters regulated by statute as long as it does so without contravening or
conflicting with a statutory provision.69 The Supreme Court has held that,
notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of statutory provisions, courts
retain a residual discretionary power to grant relief, and only an explicit
ouster of jurisdiction should be allowed to deny jurisdiction to a superior
court.70 The Supreme Court held that there are two prerequisites to the
exercise of discretion, first that the subject matter is within thejurisdiction
of the court, and second that the court has taken into consideration all the
63. Re Skydome Corporation, supra note 55.
64. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v. "inherent powers of a court".
65. C.H.R.C. v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 at para. 35.
66. Mr. Justice Farley, citing Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 37, 4th ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1982) at para. 14, in Re Royal Oak Mines (1999) 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 at para. 4
(Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), Farley J. thereinafter Royal Oak Mines].
67. Halsbury 's, ibid. at para. 14. Socidtd des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Association
of Parents for Fairness in Education, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549 at paras. 94 -95 [hereinafter Socidtj
des Acadiens].
68. Socidtd des Acadiens, ibid..
69. Ibid. at para. 95; see also Baxter Student Housing v. College Housing Co-operative,
[ 1976] 2 S.C.R. 475 at 480 [hereinafter Baxter].
70. C.H.R.C., supra note 65 at paras. 10, 32.
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relevant factors.7 The Supreme Court has emphasized that there is a
distinction between the jurisdiction of a court to exercise its power and the
appropriateness of exercising its discretion in a particular circumstance.
72
In the context of priority charges in the insolvency context, the courts
have held that there is an inherent jurisdiction to subordinate existing
security, but that it should only be exercised in extraordinary
circumstances. 73 In one case a court noted that the granting of DIP
financing did not change priorities orjeopardize security, rather it was an
acknowledgement that DIP lenders should be paid in priority because the
financing was for the benefit of all creditors, secured and unsecured.
74
There, it was anticipated that there would be greater assets available for
all creditors as the result of completion of contracts and receipt of
receivables. 7
5
The exercise of inherent jurisdiction has both a procedural and a
substantive component, although the line between these is frequently
overlapping or blurred. The courts have the jurisdiction to control their
process, aimed at ensuring procedural fairness and a timely resolution of
applications under the CCAA. The granting of priority financing may well
be an exercise of inherent jurisdiction in the sense that the CCAA process
will only be fair if the debtor corporation is afforded an opportunity to
attempt to work out its affairs as a going concern business before senior
creditors move to enforce their claims through liquidation. Granting a
stay when the corporation cannot continue to operate without financing
is a mere postponement of liquidation. In that sense, it is an exercise of
discretion to both control and bring an element of fairness to the legislated
process, having regard to prejudice to the parties and the need for
timeliness.
Courts have also discussed this notion of inherent jurisdiction on the
basis of an equitable jurisdiction. Waddams et al. observe that modern
substantive common law is derived almost entirely from equity, or that it
frequently incorporates equitable principles. 76 The key principles are that
equitable remedies are only available at the court's discretion, that the
interests of the plaintiff must be weighed in the balance of all interests
involved in the proceeding, that the courts will consider the relative
prejudice to parties in ordering equitable remedies, and that the courts are
71. Soci&t4 des Acadiens, supra note 67 at para. 123.
72. C.H.R.C., supra note 65 at paras. 13-14.
73. Re United Used Auto & Truck Parts (1999), 12 C.B.R. 144 at para 24 (B.C. S.C.)
[hereinafter Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.)]. See also Royal Oak Mines, supra note 66.
74. Canadian Asbestos, supra note 11 at paras. 26-27.
75. Ibid.
76. Stephen Waddams etal., Remedies Cases andMaterials, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery,
1988) at 517.
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concerned with the efficacy and efficiency of their own process. 77 Courts
have recognized that equitable remedies are often intrusive and
burdensome, and they will balance the specific relief to one party against
the burden of that form of relief to other parties. 78 Judges will exercise
their equitable jurisdiction to give effect to the law and fill gaps where the
legislation is not specific.
In a similar but also distinguishable context, that of appointment of
receivers and priority charges, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that
the origins of a receiver' s jurisdiction are located in the equity jurisdiction
of the Court of Chancery and that, while jurisdiction cannot be exercised
contrary to statute, nothing precludes its exercise to supplement a statute
and effectits objectives.79 In determining priority for payment of receivers,
the courts have set guidelines as part of the exercise of theirjurisdiction. 80
In such cases, courts consider both the objectives of the legislation and the
role of the receiver, which is to preserve and realize on the assets of the
corporation on behalf of the creditors. The situations are analogous, in
that the roles of both receivers and monitors are grounded in equity.
However, the monitor serves a broader mandate than does a receiver, in
that it is assisting in the protection of value of assets while also facilitating
the development of a plan that will benefit all interested stakeholders. In
the CCAA context, therefore, the courts must consider the legislative
objectives of facilitating a workout and the role of the monitor in that
endeavour, in order to determine when and where to exercise jurisdiction
to order a priority charge.
Moreover, practically speaking, while monitors are independent officers
of the court, they are also dependent on future appointments as monitors.
Given that there are limited numbers of actors in insolvency litigation in
Canada, there is also normative pressure on monitors to act fairly and
reasonably and to carefully control administration costs. 8 I
In many CCAA cases, the courts' granting of DIP financing has a
substantive purpose: to afford time for the corporation to continue
operations while resolving the restructuring plan because of the broader
interests at stake if the corporation becomes bankrupt. Canadian courts
frequently cite the potential economic consequences for employees, local
77. Ibid. at 521-2.
'7S. Ibid.
79. Baxter, supra note 69.
80. See for example, Braid Builders Supply & Fuel v. Genevieve Mortgage Corp. (1972), 17
C.B.R. 305 (Man. C.A.).
81. This type of observation has been made in the context of nominee directors of corporations,
in the sense that they are to act in the best interests of the corporation independent of their
nominating shareholders, but at the same time risk having a short career as a nominee director.
820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. 123 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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trade suppliers, communities and other unsecured creditors.8 2 Thus the
granting of DIP financing is an exercise of equitable jurisdiction, equity
coming into play when the statutory framework does not address or
provide a remedy that redresses some risk or harm.8 3 The question is,
what should be required of the debtor corporation or creditors seeking the
DIP financing in terms of demonstrating the risk of harm and thus the
necessity for an equitable remedy of DIP financing? Tysoe J. noted that
demonstrating that it would be beneficial is not a sufficient threshold,
rather it requires that DIP financing be critical for the business to continue
to operate in order for the debtor corporation to successfully restructure
its affairs.8 4
With respect to the DIP financing question, the courts have held that
equity underpins the courts' CCAA jurisdiction. The CCAA's objective is
broader than just preservation and realization of assets for the benefit of
creditors; it is to facilitate plans of arrangement with creditors.85 The
court is concerned with the survival of the debtor corporation long enough
to present a plan. The courts have exercised discretion to grant priority
payment to the monitor, but other professional fees have been denied
where there was no evidence that priority was necessary for continued
operations and where cash flow allowed for monthly professional fee
payments.86 The granting of DIP financing has included cases where the
security was granted on unencumbered assets of the debtor corporation
and thus existing security was not compromised;87 where the existing
secured creditor was not adversely affected by the financing order;88
where the financing was obtained with the consent of the existing secured
creditors, where the money was advanced for the benefit of all creditors;89
and where the reduction in value of existing creditors' security was not
significant in terms of the overall value involved and in terms of the
overall economic and financial effects of declining such a request. 90
In Re Dylex, the court found that, in the absence of new priority
financing even where there was an opposing secured creditor, the
company would not have been able to obtain the inventory for stores nor
82. See for example Re Skydome, supra note 55 and Anvil, supra note 7.
83. Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.), supra note 73 at para. 29.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid. atpara. 16.
86. Re Starcom, supra note 9 at paras. 48-54.
87. Westar Mining, supra note 11; The T. Eaton Company, supra note 55.
88. Re Dylex, supra note 29; Re Chef Ready Foods (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 307 (B.C. S.C.),
aff'd, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C.C.A.); Hong Kong Bank, supra note 33.
89. Canadian Asbestos, supra note 11; supplemental reasons (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 291 (Gen.
Div.).
90. Re Skydome, supra note 55 at 5, Blair J..
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provide assurances to suppliers to guarantee future production. 91 Houlden
J. concluded that granting DIP financing was the only way in which the
company could continue in operation to the benefit of 12,000 employees
and large numbers of people indirectly affected, such as suppliers and
their employees. 92 The court held that while creditors are not compelled
to give any additional credit, the creditors' security may be weakened by
the court's approval of DIP financing.93
In restructuring proceedings, a court will engage in a balancing of
prejudices between the parties, and secured creditors may be required to
make some sacrifice in order to achieve reasonably anticipated benefits
for all stakeholders.94 The objective of the CCAA is broader than
preservation and realization of assets for the benefit of creditors; it is to
facilitate arrangements and thus protect broad interests in the corporation.95
Thus limited DIP financing has been granted to allow all stakeholders an
opportunity to negotiate a restructuring plan, such financing aimed in part
at the public interest in trying to avoid the social and economic
consequences of firm failure.96 At the same time, the courts have
recognized that DIP financing can erode the security of creditors and thus
the court should make such orders where there is a reasonable prospect
of successfully restructuring.97
Blair J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in endorsing an order
for DIP financing in Re Royal Oak Mines, held that extraordinary relief
such as DIP financing with priority status should be granted only in an
amount that is reasonably necessary to meet the debtor's urgent needs
over the sorting out period. He held that the financing should be enough
to "keep the lights on" and enable it to meet appropriate preventive
maintenance measures, but that an initial order should approach that
objective in a judicious and cautious manner. 98 In Royal Oak, the debtor
corporation was seeking super-priority financing over all lenders, including
some lien claimants. The lien claimants, whom the court noted ranked
first in priority, were not given notice of the application.99 The court was
concerned about the quantity of proposed DIP financing on broad terms
and without the benefit of interested parties having the opportunity to
91. Re Dylex, supra note 29.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Re Skydome, supra note 55 at 5. Royal Oak Mines, supra note 66 at para. 5, Farley J..
95. Re Skydome, ibid. at para. 28.
96. Supra note 5 at 101. See also Re Skydome, ibid.
97. Re Skydome, ibid. at para. 30.
98. Re Royal Oak Mines (1999), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 at para. 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial
List]) [hereinafter Re Royal Oak Mines].
99. Ibid. at paras. 9-11.
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properly review the information and to consider their positions."° The
court held that financing requests in initial orders should be confined to
what is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the debtor
corporation during a brief but realistic period on an urgent basis.1"' This
is because the granting of such priority often places encumbrances ahead
of pre-existing claims and such changes should not be imported lightly,
if at all, into the creditor mix.0 2 The court held that affected parties are
entitled to a reasonable opportunity to think about their potential impact,
and to consider such things as whether or not the CCAA approach to the
insolvency, rather than a receivership or bankruptcy, is the appropriate
one in the circumstances. Parties should be given an opportunity to decide
to what extent, if at all, they are prepared to have their positions affected
by DIP or super priority financing. 103 The court thus limited the amount
of DIP financing that it would sanction in the initial order.
Subsequent to that decision, Farley J., in the same CCAA application,
held that while the courts have considerable power under both the CCAA
and their inherent jurisdiction to grant super-priority financing, that
jurisdiction is not limitless. "4 Thus, while DIP financing may be granted
because it is reasonably anticipated that there are benefits to be derived
from any compromise of creditors' claims, there may be statutory
provisions that limit the inherent jurisdiction of the court to grant such
priority.105 Here, the court held that the Builders Lien Act operated in such
a way as to limit the court's jurisdiction to grant a super-priority of DIP
financing over the lien claimants."0
The issue of DIP financing is currently a hotly debated one, particu-
larly in light of the increase in CCAA applications, accompanying
applications for DIP financing, and the appearance for the first time of
DIP financing specialty lenders.0 7 In practice, however, the number of
cases in which DIP financing has been opposed are relatively few, or are
focused on the amount sought as opposed to the actual exercise of the
court's discretion. Moreover, where such financing is objected to, the
100. Ibid. at paras. 12, 21.
101. Ibid. at para. 21.
102. Ibid. at para. 24.
103. Ibid.
104. Royal Oak Mines, supra note 66, citing Baxter, supra note 69 and Canada (Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development) v. Curragh Inc. (1994), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 148 at 159
(Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
105. Royal Oak Mines, ibid. at paras. 6-7. The Court expressly declined to import the
approach of the U.S. courts under United States bankruptcy legislation.
106. Ibid. at para. 7. Mr. Justice Farley held that even if he did have jurisdiction to grant a
super-priority over the liens, he would decline to exercise his discretion in this respect on the
particular facts of the case. Builders Lien Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 41, s. 11.
107. Supra note 56 at 1.
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courts have required the debtor corporation to come back within a very
limited time period to justify continued or additional relief. In such cases,
the courts have been rigorous in their assessment of whether the stake-
holders, having considered their positions, really believe that there is a
possibility of a feasible workout plan. 108
Alexander Zimmerman has recently argued that it is fundamentally
unfair that those with little economic incentive to allow the debtor
corporation to restructure should be asked to bear both the risk and cost
of super-priority funding that subordinates their position. 10 9 While this
can be true, the question of whether there is any economic incentive in a
given case involves an assessment of the liquidation value of the enterprise.
In circumstances where secured creditors are likely to receive considerably
more in a restructuring than a liquidation, there is some economic
incentive to bear both the risk and cost of financing that subordinates their
interest, if the economic benefits of that financing outweigh the risks.
IV. Re United UsedAuto: The Claim by Creditors that the Court has
no Jurisdiction to Grant Non-Consensual Super-Priority
The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld thejurisdiction of the court
to order DIP financing in Re United Used Auto. The Supreme Court of
Canada subsequently granted leave to appeal the B.C. judgment and this
would have been the Supreme Court's first consideration of this issue. It
would also have settled the matter of jurisdiction to order DIP financing
that continues to be hotly contested by secured lenders. However, in
March 2001, the parties in Re United Used Auto settled the matter. The
law thus currently stands that Canadian courts have jurisdiction to grant
priority to funding for a reorganization under the CCAA ahead of secured
creditors without their consent, although challenges tojurisdiction continue
to be brought. This part discusses the Re United UsedAuto case, in order
to more fully appreciate the basis on which the courts have determined
jurisdiction.
United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd. sold car parts, conducted a
wrecking business and had engaged in acquiring numerous parcels of real
estate over the years. It had been experiencing financial difficulty for
more than a decade and financed its losses by heavily mortgaging its
108. Re Royal Oak O.J. No. 1364, supra note 7.
109. H. A. Zimmermani "Financing the Debtor in Possession" (Tenth Annual Meeting and
Conference of The Insolvency Institute of Canada, November 1999) Carswell, Insolvency Pro
at 15.
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properties. By the time it was insolvent, the secured debt alone was $24
million and the value of the real estate was $23- $49 million, depending
on estimates and whether the land was to be sold en bloc or by parcel. 10
Secured creditors had made a series of arrangements, entered forbearance
agreements, and then finally moved to enforce their claims through
orders nisi, expiry of redemption periods, and an Order for Conduct of
Sale. It was at the point of sale, an order to which the debtor had
consented, that the debtor applied for a stay under the CCAA.
At first instance, the application for a stay under the CCAA was made
on an exparte motion before Tysoe J. of the British Columbia Supreme
Court. Tysoe J. granted the stay application, appointed a monitor and
ordered all the monitor's reasonable fees and disbursements to be paid in
priority to secured charges. He also ordered that the reasonable legal fees
of the debtor corporation under the CCAA process be paid in priority. The
maximum amount of these administration charges was to be $500,000."'
The monitor was directed to engage in a range of activities to assist the
petitioners in the development of a plan, to monitor cash flow and protect
the assets. 2 The court declined to consider the question of DIP financing
on an ex parte motion.
On November 19, 1999 Tysoe J. issued a further judgement in the
matter. On notice to creditors, the debtor again sought $1.1 million in DIP
financing. Secured creditors moved to set aside the initial order on
grounds of inadequate disclosure and allegations of bad faith. The court
declined to find either improper disclosure or bad faith, and refused to lift
the stay order under the CCAA. This was notwithstanding the fact that the
court found there was evidence that the debtor had not acted reasonably
in the attempts to sell the land over the past two years." 3 The court held
that it was not bad faith to bring the CCAA application at this time because
the debtor was concerned that an en bloc sale would mean an end to the
operating business. 14 The court allowed the sale to continue, but directed
the listing agents to deal with the monitor and the debtor rather than the
creditors. The court denied the debtor's request for DIP financing to carry
on operations. The court cautioned that in determining a DIP financing
request and in balancing the interests involved in a CCAA proceeding
there should be cogent evidence that the benefit of DIP financing clearly
110. Re an Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and Re United




113. Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.), supra note 73 at para. 19, Tysoe J.
114. Ibid. atpara. 17.
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outweighs the potential prejudice to the lenders whose security is being
subordinated." 5 It found that it had inherent jurisdiction to order DIP
financing, but that this jurisdiction to subordinate secured interests
should only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances.' 6 It further
held that while DIP financing would have been beneficial, it was not
satisfied that it was critical to keep the business operating, thus the motion
for DIP financing was dismissed." 7
However, the court affirmed the priority charge for the monitor's fees
and disbursements. It held that the monitor was acting on behalf of the
court to provide information and monitoring for the benefit of all
parties." 8 It directed the monitor to take account of all interests, including
debtor, secured and unsecured creditors in proceeding to conduct the sale
process and consider offers." 9 The monitor is an officer of the court and
has an obligation to act independent of both the debtor and the creditors. 12 0
The court also granted an order funding the debtor's restructuring legal
expenses, included as part of the administration charge similar to cost of
the monitor, as a limited substitute for DIP financing.2 ' The court noted
that payment for restructuring would normally come out of the cash flow,
but here there was no cash flow and no DIP financing, thus it was an
appropriate case in which to grant a priority charge on the legal fees of the
debtor reasonably incurred in connection with the restructuring exercise.
The court cautioned however, that should there be a shortfall in recovery
for lenders, it would unfair to request the secured creditors to bear all the
burden of legal fees for those acting against them, and thus they would not
be required to underwrite the expenses of lawyers who act unreasonably
or who act on unreasonable instructions to frustrate the recovery of
monies owed to creditors." The court reduced the amount originally
approved from $500,000 to a maximum of $200,000, pending any further
application justifying an increased limit.1 23 Thus the priority charges
granted amounted to less than 1% of the secured debt.
115. Ibid. at para. 28.
116. Ibid. at para. 24.
117. Ibid. at paras. 29-30.
118. Ibid. at para. 31, relying on Re Starcom, supra note 9.
119. Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.), ibid. at para. 19.
120. Ibid. at para. 20. The Court also noted that creditors were free under the come back clause
to seek to have the monitor replaced if it was not performing its obligations under the statute.
121. Ibid. atparas. 32-36.
122. Ibid. at paras. 34-35.
123. Ibid. at para. 36.
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The secured creditors appealed on the sole question of the court's
jurisdiction to grant priority charges to pay the fees and disbursements of
the monitor, and the legal fees of the debtor associated with the restructuring
in the absence of secured creditors' consent.124 The British Columbia
Court of Appeal in Re United UsedAuto affirmed the B.C. Supreme Court
decision, confirming the lower court's equitable jurisdiction to order
super-priority financing.1 25 The Court of Appeal held that the effective
achievement of the legislation's objective requires a broad and flexible
exercise of jurisdiction to facilitate a restructuring, and the court's
equitable jurisdiction permits orders granting super-priority in some
circumstances. 126 The court took note of the fact that the debtors had left
it "very late in the day to apply for CCAA relief' and observed that the
secured creditors had failed in their efforts to oppose the stay, but that no
appeal was taken from that part of the order.
The court held that once the stay order was granted, the legislation
required the appointment of a monitor. It went on to rule that the required
duties of the monitor specified in the CCAA were extensive and that
Parliament knew of the courts' granting priority charges for monitors
when it enacted these provisions in 1997. Thus it may be taken to have
understood that the court will continue to exercise its jurisdiction. The
court contrasted those provisions of the CCAA that expressly specify
what will not be considered an administration charge. 27 It held that a
monitor will need assurance that it will be paid before it will act and this
priority charge is the only effective means of securing payment.128 It
found that the administration charges were a substitute for DIP financing,
and that where no DIP financing has been granted, which would normally
cover the debtor's costs associated with the workout, the court has
inherent jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to order such costs to be
covered. It further held that granting priority on the restructuring costs,
whether separately or as part of DIP financing, rests on the same equitable
foundations as monitors' fees. 29
The Court of Appeal also ruled that it had jurisdiction to grant DIP
financing based on equitable principles, but upheld the trial judgment that
declined to exercise this discretion on the facts of the case. 30 The court
held that this is an extraordinary remedy and that its jurisdiction can be
124. Re United Used Auto (B.C. C.A.), supra note 3 at para. 1.
125. Ibid. atparas. 30-31.
126. Ibid. at para. 12.
127. Ibid. at paras. 14-15; see for example supra note 1, s. 11.8(1).
128. Re United Used Auto (B.C. C.A.), ibid. at para. 15.
129. Ibid. atparas. 31-35.
130. Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.), supra note 73.
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exercised without consent of the secured creditors notwithstanding the
fact that the administration charge or DIP financing would rank ahead of
their claims.
The creditors sought and received leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada.' 3' They argued that the court does not have jurisdiction to
grant priority to funding for a CCAA reorganization without the consent
of secured creditors because it interferes with priorities among secured
interests and because there is a need for certainty in secured transactions.132
They argued that the courts are exercising a broad and undefined
jurisdiction that interferes with the property rights set out in the BIA. The
Supreme Court granted leave. However, in March 2001, the parties
settled the matter by agreeing to reduce the monitor's fees, and thus there
is no longer an opportunity to have the Supreme Court finally determine
the matter. Yet the court' sjurisdiction to grant priority financing continues
to be challenged in CCAA applications. The Re United Used Auto case
squarely raised the issue of whether the exercise of the court's equitable
jurisdiction infringes on the priorities set out in the BIA for the enforcement
of credit or other statutory property rights under provincial secured
transaction legislation.
There are some initial observations to be made. First, there is no
evidence that the courts are exercising a "broad and undefined jurisdiction"
to order priority financing. As Part VI illustrates, there are principles that
the courts have consistently applied to determine whether the discretion
should be exercised. In Re United Used Auto, the court found it had
jurisdiction, held that this should be exercised as an extraordinary
remedy, declined to make an order for DIP financing, and reduced the
amount given in other priority charges to less than 1% of the secured debt.
Second, the notion that the CCAA stay preserves the status quo does
not mean that a court lacks jurisdiction to order priority financing. The
courts have held that in the stay context of CCAA proceedings, status quo
does not mean freezing the pre-stay debt status of each creditor. Rather,
preserving the status quo means preserving the interests of all creditors
(secured and unsecured) and the interests of suppliers, consumers,
employees, landlords, investors and the public, and in that context the
debtor is allowed to continue to operate during a brief period in which a
plan can be devised and negotiated with creditors.'33 The courts have a
supervisory role to preserve the status quo in the sense that creditors are
131. Re United Used Auto (S.C.C.), supra note 3.
132. Ibid., motion record of Rashid Aziz, application for leave to appeal, argument at para. 26.
133. Re Starcom, supra note 9 at paras. 17, 19; Re Alberta Pacific Terminals (1991), 8 C.B.R.
(3d) 99 at para. 23 (B.C. S.C.), Huddart J..
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not allowed to maneuver to impair the financial situation of the corpora-
tion during the CCAA process. 13 4 The courts are to facilitate the process
to the point where a plan is approved or it is evident that the workout
process is doomed.'35
In considering whether there is a conflict between the BIA and the
CCAA on the issue of DIP financing, both are federal statutes and thus
there are no paramountcy issues. The CCAA and BIA are complementary
statutes with different objectives and aimed at different aspects of the
insolvent corporation. The BIA does permit workouts for consumers and
businesses, but is largely aimed at the orderly distribution of the value of
assets to creditors on bankruptcy. There has, however, been some
fluctuation in this respect in recent years and the proposal provisions have
occasionally been used as a key tool of the BIA. Aside from the proposal
provisions of the BIA, which are similar but more codified than those in
the CCAA, the scheme of the BIA comes into effect at the point of
bankruptcy .136 In contrast, the CCAA is aimed at the period in which the
corporation is insolvent, and has the objective of facilitating arrangements
between debtor corporations and creditors. The CCAA co-exists with the
BIA in Canada's insolvency and bankruptcy regime, and notwithstanding
that the courts have adopted a purposive interpretation of the CCAA in the
past 15 years, legislators did not see the necessity of dismantling it during
the major amendments to both statutes in 1997. The CCAA is a statute
with extremely time-limited remedies."' The courts have declined to
grant initial stays where it is evident that there is no possibility of a
successful workout. When a stay is granted a court will facilitate an
expeditious process, and failing agreement to a plan, creditors can move
to realize their claims under the BIA. Thus, creditors' remedies are only
stayed for very limited periods.
One authority relied on by creditors in Re United Used Auto is the
Sparrow Electric decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. 3 s The
judgment offers important insights into how to approach issues of
interpretation. The Supreme Court in Sparrow Electric held that it must
be sensitive to differing legislative objectives when interpreting statutory
134. Re Starcom, ibid. at para. 19.
135. Ibid.
136. It is helpful to note that the proposal provisions under the BIA, like the arrangement
provisions under the CCAA, do not conflict with the provisions of the BIA regarding the orderly
distribution of assets because they involve a time period prior, specifically, the stay period
during which the corporation is attempting to work out its affairs to avoid bankruptcy.
137. The initial stay is 30 days, with a fairly high threshold established by the courts for any
extension on that stay.
138. Royal BankofCanada v. Sparrow Electric Corporation, [199711 S.C.R. 411 [hereinafter
Sparrow Electric].
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language that appears to conflict. 3 9 The court held that at the point that
a receiver is appointed to enforce security under the BIA, in a priority
competition between a perfected general security agreement (GSA) and
a deemed trust under the Income Tax Act, the GSA prevailed at the point
of bankruptcy because the property vested in the creditor at the time that
the agreement was concluded."4 The court ruled that when a debtor fails
to set aside remittances, the crown's claim becomes one of a beneficiary
under a deemed trust, not a real trust because the value of the remittances
owed cannot be identified separate from the rest of the debtor's assets.'41
Thus at the point of bankruptcy, the court has held that it will defer to the
priorities set out in the BIA, and that this interpretation of the ITA was
consistent with and supported the scheme of distribution under the BIA.
Applying this type of reasoning previously used by the Supreme Court
of Canada to the CCAA, at the point of bankruptcy the scheme of the BIA
takes over and a court will no longer be able to exercise its jurisdiction to
order priority charges. Thus the CCAA and the BIA are involved
sequentially and there is no conflict. The CCAA proceeding terminates
and the BIA process may or may not be utilized, depending on whether
there is a private liquidation, receivership proceedings under provincial
legislation or bankruptcy proceedings under the BIA. The court may
validly affect priority in a non-bankruptcy situation. The exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction does not conflict with the language of either the
CCAA or the BIA. The Supreme Court of Canada has previously indicated
that an exercise of inherent jurisdiction must not be in conflict with
statutory provisions. Here, there is no conflict; the BIA does not address
priority in the stay period under the CCAA nor is it operational during
CCAA proceedings, and thus, jurisdiction is not ousted by that statute.
The exercise of the court's discretion under the CCAA must take into
account the circumstances of the debtor's insolvency, the objectives of
the CCAA, the relative prejudice to granting or not granting financing to
secured lenders, and the interests of unsecured lenders, employees,
consumers, tort claimants and the public. The objective of the CCAA is
broader than the preservation of secured credit, and this must be considered
when reconciling the provisions of the CCAA and the BIA.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid. Subsequent to this decision, the Income Tax Act was amended to overcome the
problem raised in Sparrow Electric, see BIA, supra note 2, s. 227(4.1) as am. by S.C. 1998,
c. 19.
141. Thus it is a claim on unsecured assets of the debtor and falls in priority behind secured
creditors.
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At the point that a trustee in bankruptcy is enforcing claims and
liquidating assets, courts have deferred to the scheme set out under the
BIA. However, in reality, a number of insolvencies do not result in
bankruptcy. Rather, the receiver liquidates the assets pursuant to provincial
legislation under secured creditor or court supervised proceedings. What
distinguishes the issue of DIP financing under the CCAA is that it is
granted at a different point in the process and pursuant to proceedings
under a statute with different legislative objectives than those of the BIA,
specifically, providing a brief period in order to facilitate a workout with
creditors.
The Supreme Court in Sparrow Electric also held that the court must
be sensitive to personal property security regimes and the need for
certainty in commercial transactions.' 42 Few would disagree with this
finding. However, it does not flow from the need for commercial certainty
that the court has no jurisdiction to grant time-limited remedies in
extraordinary circumstances in order to effect the aims of the CCAA. In
fact, given the Canadian courts' clear guidance on when and why they
will exercise such discretion, as discussed above, there continues to be
sufficient certainty in commercial transactions. Secured creditors are
fully aware that there may be some slight compromise of their claims in
order to meet the legislative objectives, and arguably they currently factor
that into their risk assessment and lending decisions. Given that the only
jurisdiction in Canada in the past fifteen years that has declined to take
jurisdiction to provide DIP financing is Nova Scotia, secured creditors
have had certainty in their commercial transactions.143 Moreover, in the
Nova Scotia case, the court considered only the statutory language and
not the court's broader equitable jurisdiction. It was heard in the early
years of the renaissance of the CCAA and the court essentially invited
parties to seek reconsideration if they could point to authority where
priority had been granted for a monitor.'1" Although there appears not to
have been a motion for reconsideration in that case, other Canadian courts
have uniformly declined to follow the Nova Scotia court's reasoning.145
Secured creditors already factor the risk of firm failure into their risk
assessment and decision making into the granting of credit. Arguably this
includes a risk assessment of DIP financing charges under the CCAA.
Secured creditors are the most sophisticated creditors, with the greatest
142. Sparrow Electric, supra note 138 at para. 22.
143. Re Fairview Industries (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 43 (N.S. S.C.(T.D.)).
144. Ibid. at 15.
145. See for example, Royal Bank v. Fracmaster (1999), 244 A.R. 93 (C.A.); Royal Oak
Mines, supra note 66; Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.), supra note 73.
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bargaining power and access to information in making contracts. That is
precisely why the CCAA is aimed at interests broader than those of
secured creditors. If any group of creditors has not already accounted for
the risk of insolvency in the cost of credit, it is trade suppliers, employees
and other unsecured creditors, who are some of the parties at whom the
legislation is aimed.
A veto by secured creditors could act to the serious detriment of many
other stakeholders whose interests are also accounted for in the CCAA
process. Under the current provisions, the secured creditors are not
deprived of their property rights. Rather, a comparatively small part of
their claim may be compromised. In some cases that compromise is only
temporary, because the workout actually provides the secured creditors
with the full value of their claim, or with a much greater value than its
liquidation value.
As the Court of Appeal in Re United Used Auto observed, if a super-
priority cannot be granted without the consent of secured creditors, those
creditors would have an effective veto over CCAA relief in many such
applications. 46 The court held that Parliament did not intend that secured
creditors could indirectly frustrate the objectives of the Act. '47 Arguably,
if Parliament had intended that secured creditors have a veto, it would
have expressly set that requirement in the Act. Since the secured creditors
have full remedies and priority under private security proceedings and
provincial legislation, or under the BIA after a CCAA process has failed,
Parliament has allowed the CCAA to temper those powerful rights during
the limited but vitally important workout period.
1. Why the "Secured Creditor Veto" is neither an Alternative nor
Efficient
H.A. Zimmerman has assisted in focusing the DIP financing debate by
proposing his own model for legislative change. He proposes a model in
which the courts could make early determinations of class, and then have
the classes vote by percentage and dollar amount on the same basis as
required for endorsement of a proposed plan of arrangement, or have the
court grant or withhold approval of DIP financing on their collective
behalf where it is unrealistic to obtain consent. He suggests that only
where the class has consented or a court has deemed the class to have
consented will super-priority be given in DIP financing over a particular
class.148 Zimmerman suggests that the risk to a class seeking to protect its
146. Re United Used Auto (B.C. C.A.), supra note 3 at para. 29.
147. Ibid.
148. Supra note 109.
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priority is that the DIP lender may be dissuaded from lending, thus
triggering a liquidation of the debtor corporation. 49 This notion of a
failure to endorse means secured creditors would be given a veto in the
CCAA process. It would seriously shift the balance of power and interests
under the statute towards the secured lenders. While I agree with
Zimmerman that debtor corporations should not be seeking DIP financing
without some prospect of a plan, this proposal does not require that DIP
financing be granted only where there is a reasonable prospect of a plan.
It merely grants a veto to senior creditors who already have the greatest
bargaining power in the proceeding.
The current approach of the courts is not a total expropriation of
property interests; it is a relatively small potential compromise with the
risk that secured creditors will have to temporarily defer receipt of all or
at worst most of their claims. In fact, in some cases, secured creditors will
receive even more of their claim in a successful restructuring than they
would have through a liquidation of assets under a bankruptcy. In
contrast, giving these lenders a veto would expropriate the interests of
unsecured creditors and others in having a reasonable restructuring plan
implemented under the CCAA.
The difficulty with a "secured creditor veto" approach is also that it
assumes no information asymmetries and relatively high sophistication
among the parties early in the process. The senior secured creditors
already have the greatest access to the court-supervised process and they
have the information and resources to effectively argue that the court
should not exercise its equitable jurisdiction to grant DIP financing in a
particular case. The proposal that they be given a veto does not adequately
address the interests of numerous other stakeholders such as employees,
local trade suppliers, contingent creditors and others who require time to
clarify their interests and seek status, counsel and information in order to
effectively participate. Frequently, lack of resources and information
asymmetries act as a bar to their participation. Premature definition of
creditor classes in the proceeding could further disadvantage these parties
by foreclosing their ability to make submissions on a key restructuring
issue.
The court's precise reason for exercising its inherent jurisdiction is
because the objectives of the CCAA are broader than solely the preservation
of creditors' claims. It is unclear what implementing early voting in
respect of DIP financing would constructively contribute to this process,
other than to give secured creditors a veto over super-priority financing
and thus likely a veto over the ability of the debtor corporation to continue
149. Ibid.
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operating as a going concern during the negotiations for a workout.
Zimmerman does make a number of important points about the need for
adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing before the court determines
whether or not to grant DIP financing. 50 This is one of the key principles
that should guide the courts, as is discussed in Part VI.
V. Why the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Model of DIP Financing is
Inappropriate for Canada
Several practitioners have suggested that Canadian courts should adopt
the U.S. approach to financing pending the development of a restructuring
plan. The rules for such financing in the United States are more rigid and
defined by Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.'' The difficulty
with importing these notions into the Canadian context is that the
American scheme is implemented in a highly rehabilitative debtor-
oriented regime and the rigid guidelines for interim financing are aimed
at creating a balance between the interests of creditors and those of the
debtor corporation. In contrast, the Canadian regime already substantially
favours secured creditors and the CCAA is aimed in part at creating a
balance to that priority in the limited circumstances of a workout process.
Statutory priority for secured creditors in DIP financing under the CCAA
would further tip the balance in favour of these interests to the detriment
of other interests.
Under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, when a party files a
petition an automatic stay is imposed on both secured and unsecured
creditors. The business continues to operate with the debtor in possession
(DIP), which controls a new legal entity, the estate, and acquires the rights
and obligations of a trustee in bankruptcy.' Thus the term DIP is used
in a very different context in U.S. insolvency proceedings. Like Canadian
courts under the CCAA, American judges have held that the purpose of
Chapter 11 is to provide a period of time in which the debtor corporation
can attempt to negotiate a reorganization plan acceptable to creditors. 53
As with Canada's regime, the U.S. scheme provides for a process of
disclosure, negotiation and then voting by class for a proposed plan.
5 4
150. Ibid. at 16.
151. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. (1988), as amended [hereinafter Chapter 11].
152. E. Warren and J. Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1996) at 398. Supra note 151, § 363. A trustee can be appointed under Chapter 11, but
it is rare. In such cases, the trustee is a fiduciary to all parties with an interest in the estate. Anna
Chou, "Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: Electing a New Board" (1991) 65 Am. Bank. L.J.
559 at 580.
153. Warren and Westbrook, ibid. at 397.
154. A creditors' committee can be appointed to monitor the activities of the debtor. Warren
and Westbrook, ibid. at 399.
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The failure to devise a reorganization plan acceptable to creditors in
required amounts of support will lead to bankruptcy and eventual
liquidation. The court in sanctioning the plan must ensure that it meets the
statutory requirements including the requisite amount of creditor support.
A key difference in the U.S. scheme, which focuses primarily on
rehabilitation, is that creditors have few rights to insist on an expeditious
resolution of the proceedings. For example, the debtor corporation has a
period of 120 days in which it exclusively can propose a reorganization
plan, then an additional 60 days to have the plan accepted by creditors. 155
Thus creditors are faced with a minimum of 180 days and usually much
longer before they can move to enforce their claims. American judges
frequently extend this period of exclusivity, thus giving the debtor
corporation greater control over the proceedings for prolonged periods of
time. One U.S. practitioner recently reported that Chapter 11 cases take
up to seven years.'56
The extended stay creates an incentive to carry on business even where
the value of the enterprise is worth more liquidated. Comparatively the
U.S. thus differs from the Canadian regime in that creditors' rights are
stayed for prolonged periods without the debtor having to be accountable
to creditors. The length of the stay period often results in corporations
seeking protection of Chapter 11 to prolong the corporation's business
life, without there being any real possibility of the debtor corporation
rehabilitating itself.' 7 This is frequently to the detriment of creditors'
interests and ultimately results in an untimely liquidation of the
corporation. 5 8 Under the U.S. scheme, the stay period creates a period of
155. Supra note 151, § 1121 (b)(c). Moreover, there is greater ability to avoid legal judgments
and it is easier to restructure assets under Chapter 11. Julian R. Franks and Walter N. Torous,
"Lessons From a Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Insolvency Codes", in Jadeep S. Bhandari and
Lawrence A. Weiss, eds., Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 458-9.
156. Rick Sierry, Counsel for Loewen Corporation, "Oral Submissions", (Case Conference
Hearing, Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) 12 August 1999).
157. Bruce A. Markell, "Owners, Auctions and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations" (1991) 44 Stanford L. Review 69 at 69-72.
158. While corporations appear to be successful in the short term, only about 5% of cases
survive for any prolonged period outside of bankruptcy proceedings. Elizabeth Warren, "Why
Have a Federal Bankruptcy System?" (1992) 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1093; see also Elizabeth
Warren, "Bankruptcy Policy" (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775. Debtor corporations also tend to
forum shop in terms of state jurisdictions thought to be favourable to those in control of the
corporation. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, "The Persistence
of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts"
(1994) 17 Harv. J. of L. & Pub. Pol'y 801 at 806. The U.S. regime has also been criticized for
the growing phenomenon of multiple proceedings in which the same corporation returns to
protection of the bankruptcy court for a second or third restructuring.
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unaccountability because creditors cannot propose a reorganization plan,
and because there is excessive delay in satisfying creditors' claims, often
without value enhancement in terms of continued operations.5 9 Thus the
interim financing requirements are an effort to balance the interests of
secured creditors in a debtor-oriented regime.
As under the Canadian scheme, creditors can ask the court to lift the
stay for purposes of enforcement of their security if they can establish that
it is necessary for the protection of their interests, although courts will not
interfere lightly with the exclusive period. 160 The court is required to act
on any request to lift a stay within 30 days or the stay is automatically
lifted with respect to a creditor's collateral. The DIP has the onus of
demonstrating that there is adequate protection of the secured creditor's
collateral. The court will lift a stay if it determines that there is lack of
adequate protection.' 6' The tests for adequate protection are: periodic
payments, additional or replacement liens, and "such other means of
providing adequate protection as will result in the realization by such
entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such
property". 162 An equity cushion can be found to be adequate protection.
Under Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor corporation has the right to
reject unfavourable contracts and assume valuable ones, and there is
suspension of accrual of interest on unsecured liability. 163 Secured
creditors' interests are protected by the Absolute Priority Rule (APR)
imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that each class of
creditors receive the full value of their claims in cash or securities prior
to the receipt or retention by any junior class of creditors or shareholders
of any property or interest under the reorganization plan."6 As a balance
159. There has been a recent move to address this through pre-packaged plans for publicly
traded companies where the proposed plan has already received support of key creditors and
the process is expedited. The difficulty is that the initiative for this process must come from the
debtor corporation and those seeking merely to defer liquidation are unlikely to use this
process. Similarly, the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code included a fast track
procedure for small businesses and single asset companies. This too is exclusively at the
election of the DIP. Christopher Frost, "Bankruptcy Redistribution Policy and the Limits of
Judicial Process" (1995) 74 N.C.L. Rev. 75 at 127; Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness:
Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) at 121. The
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, established pursuant to Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 601-610, log Stat. (1997) proposed identification of those
corporations with no chance of success in order to terminate those proceedings earlier.
160. Supra note 151, § 361-62.
161. Warren and Westbrook, supra note 152 at 398, 403, 410, 412.
162. Re Rogers Development Corporation 2 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
163. Post petition creditors can be offered relatively good credit terms, Warren and Westbrook,
supra note 152 at 399.
164. Supra note 151, § 1129(b).
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to this, there is the availability of "cram down" as a means to obtain
approval of plans over the objections of dissenting creditors. This
requires the court to engage in costly and time consuming valuation
proceedings before approving a plan.165 Under the cram-down rule,
shareholders as the most junior claimants do not receive any value in the
reorganized corporation unless creditors consent or all claims are paid in
full. 166
The American Bankruptcy Code has clear rules for the granting of
debtor in possession financing. 167 Priority financing is granted during the
stay period only where the debtor has given 15 days clear notice to
creditors and a hearing is held. 168 In considering such requests the court
must be satisfied that credit could not otherwise be obtained on an
unsecured basis. 169 Then the court will approve any priority financing
only if the interests of existing secured creditors are adequately protected. 170
This includes adequate protection of the secured party in the form of
additional or replacement liens, periodic cash payments to the existing
secured creditor that will counteract the decrease in value of existing
secured credit, or other specific measures to ensure protection. 7' These
provisions are important in the U.S. context because, unlike Canada, a
corporation does not have to be insolvent to file for Chapter 1 1 protection. 72
It means that there is often equity remaining in the corporation, which is
highly relevant to the issue of interim financing, requiring shareholders
to demonstrate their commitment to reorganization by risking more of
their equity. The provisions are highly codified, as is the entire Bankruptcy
165. Warren, supra note 158 at 90.
166. The only exception is where current owners contribute new value in terms of additional
equity or credit, in which case they can retain the equivalent of that value without creditor
consent. Supra note 151, § 1129. Markell points out that this "new value exception" is not really
an exception because the only value that is protected in the new value injected, as it would be
with any new investor. Where it is beneficial is as a signal of the confidence of the shareholders
in possible turn around given their willingness to risk new capital. Supra note 157 at 111. See
also Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, "A Positive Theory of Chapter 11" (1999) 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 161 at 195.
167. Warren and Westbrook, supra note 152.
168. Zimmerman, citing Rules 4001(c) and 9001 (6)(c)(2) of Chapter 11, supra note 109 at
16. This notice and hearing requirement are not required for unsecured post-filing financing
in the ordinary course of business for actual and necessary costs of preserving the DIP,
Rotsztain, supra note 2 at 287.
169. Warren (1992), supra note 158.
170. Supra note 151, § 361, 364.
171. Ibid.
172. This is to encourage corporations to restructure their affairs before the corporation
reaches the point that it is hopelessly insolvent and therefore unlikely to reorganize successfully
Lynn M. Lopucki, "A General Theory of the Dynamics of State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System" (1982) Wisc. L. Rev. 311 at 311.
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Code and the provisions protecting secured creditors are crafted as a
balance to the considerable control that the DIP continues to exercise for
prolonged periods under a Chapter 11 workout.
Some practitioners have argued that Canadian law should adopt the
American approach to interim financing, arguing that the law should
facilitate the efficient operation of free financial markets, and that the
debtor will obtain financing where there is economic incentive to fund. 73
Yet the U.S, model is far from a free market system, in fact it is more
highly codified and less subject to market variations than Canadian
insolvency law. For example, there is no requirement that the debtor
demonstrate the acceptability of the restructuring plan to the creditor
marketplace within a relatively short period of time, as there is in the
CCAA.
The Canadian regime, which is highly time sensitive in terms of
protecting creditors' interests, may not be appropriate for the time
consuming and costly valuing process involved in granting workout
financing under the U.S. scheme. The Canadian regime has adopted a
pragmatic and expeditious process, allowing very time-limited funding
without the enormous cost and delay required in precise evaluation of
creditors' claims prior to granting that interim financing. The short stay
periods, and the granting of DIP financing on an urgent and necessary
basis, already serve to protect creditors. It allows both the debtor
corporation and creditors a short period in which to gain a fuller
understanding of how the assets are being utilized and whether there is a
chance for a workout. Any additional financing relief is only granted
where the court is persuaded that there is sufficient creditor support and
the debtor corporation has a reasonable prospect of developing a viable
business plan. Prolonging the stay period to undertake a valuation may
hamper, as opposed to enhance, that protection.
Both the American and Canadian regimes are aimed at balancing
diverse interests in restructuring within their larger bankruptcy schemes
that are debtor-oriented and creditor-oriented respectively. The BIA
grants powerful rights to secured creditors at the point of bankruptcy in
order to aid debt collection and create certainty in lending decisions. The
CCAA tempers for a very limited time period the powerful remedies of
secured creditors, by taking into account the interests of all stakeholders
in the restructuring process. The U.S. bankruptcy scheme tempers the
powerful remedies of the debtor corporation during the prolonged period
that it can remain in Chapter 11, by better balancing creditors' interests
173. Zimmerman, supra note 109.
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during this period. Importing the U.S. interim financing model into the
Canadian regime would shift the current balance of power towards those
that the Canadian scheme already favours.
VI. Principles that Courts Apply in the Granting of DIP Financing
The above discussion illustrates that Canadian courts have attempted to
find the optimal balancing of prejudices in the exercise of theirjurisdiction
to grant DIP financing or other priority and DIP financing charges. The
courts have exercised their equitable jurisdiction to grant super-priority
financing in appropriate cases. On the whole, the courts have been quite
balanced in their reasoning and have developed principles in order to
guide parties and create certainty in both credit transactions and
proceedings under the CCAA. While legislative amendment would clarify
this exercise of jurisdiction, courts would still have to engage in a
balancing of all the interests involved before making a decision.
It is important to draw out the principles being applied by courts in the
exercise of their jurisdiction to grant DIP financing. A careful reading of
the cases indicates that there are five principles currently operating in the
courts' consideration of applications for DIP financing: adequate notice,
sufficient disclosure, timeliness of the request, balancing the prejudice,
and the principle of granting priority financing as an extraordinary
remedy. While these are not always concisely and clearly articulated, the
cases discussed in Part III illustrate that they are the underlying principles
at work. Moreover, as courts have acquired experience in consideration
of DIP financing applications, these principles have become clearer and
more focused.
1. Adequate Notice
Practitioners in the past have correctly criticized the courts for granting
DIP financing on a few hours or no notice. This had been a growing
problem until the late 1990s. At that point, the courts began to clarify the
importance of adequate notice before they will consider such requests.
Courts have held that they would not consider DIP financing requests
on an ex parte basis or without adequate notice. 74 They have held that
they will grant only enough financing to "keep the lights on" for a brief
but urgent period where there has been inadequate notice. 175 Judges have
• increasingly considered with caution priority financing requests in initial
orders, holding that parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to
174. Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.), supra note 73.
175. Re Royal Oak Mines, supra note 98.
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determine how their claims will be affected by the request for priority
financing. Adequate notice is a prerequisite except in extraordinary
circumstances, and then for only limited time periods and amounts. If a
debtor corporation is seeking to compromise claims, even in extraordinary
circumstances, creditors should be given adequate notice.
Although courts typically build in comeback clauses in their initial
orders, granting DIP financing orders on an initial ex parte application
acts as a deterrent to parties who feel there is a hurdle to overcome in
overturning the initial order. Where a court grants limited financing on an
ex parte basis, it will only be long enough to give adequate notice to
creditors with a clear indication that the court will hear creditors' views
on the issue. Limiting the period of any initial financing also places the
onus of justifying any additional financing on the debtor corporation,
which has the best access to information necessary for the court to
determine if further financing is justified.
Where the courts have been slightly less consistent, but are increas-
ingly concerned, is in giving notice of a DIP financing request to all
interested parties. Typically, even where notice is given, it is not given to
employees or their bargaining agents, and frequently not to landlords,
suppliers, or other unsecured creditors. Given that the exercise of the
courts' equitable jurisdiction to grant priority financing is for the benefit
of all creditors, then those diverse creditors must be given access to the
process so that a judge can hear their views. The court will thus be in a
better position to assess the request for priority or DIP financing, be it
funding for the monitor to facilitate the development of a viable plan, or
financing to carry out business operations during the CCAA process.
2. Sufficient Disclosure
Another recurring principle in the judgments is the need for sufficient
disclosure so that creditors can fully assess the impact of DIP financing
decisions. For example, is there still equity remaining in the corporation
such that priority financing is not required? Is the financial picture such
that it is realistic to continue operations pending the workout? The courts
have been effective in directing the monitor to report to the court on the
financial and business affairs of the corporation. This has included
adequate valuing of encumbered and unencumbered assets, to ascertain
the nature and type of pre-insolvency debts, and to determine whether
there is equity remaining. This must be done early enough in the process
so that all interested parties can assess the DIP financing request in an
informed manner.
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The principle of requiring sufficient disclosure allows parties to
review information and consider their positions. Parties are to be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to assess the impact of priority and DIP
financing, and to consider whether the CCAA process or receivership and
bankruptcy is the most appropriate course of action. 7 6 The debtor has an
obligation to disclose sufficient information to allow both secured and
unsecured creditors, as well as other stakeholders, a chance to make an
informed and realistic decision regarding whether they support the DIP
financing request. In turn, this will enhance the court's consideration of
the request and exercise of discretion.
3. Timeliness of the Request
This is clearly a principle in the courts' consideration, although judges
have occasionally been inconsistent in the reasoning they use in respect
of timeliness in granting the stay, and, as a result, in granting priority
financing for the monitor, professionals and continued operations. A
clearer articulation of this principle could assist the parties in CCAA
proceedings.
While the CCAA is a process of last resort for debtors, courts should
take into account the timing and prior conduct of debtors in making a
determination to grant or maintain stays. There are good policy reasons
for attempting a private workout with creditors, and thus a debtor may not
apply for protection until that avenue has been exhausted and creditors are
moving to enforce their claims. In such cases, it may be reasonable for a
court to exercise its discretion to grant the stay, and then, where appropriate,
order a priority charge for the fees and disbursements of the monitor and/
or DIP financing.
However, there is a difference between good faith efforts to make
arrangements with creditors and then seeking the protection of the court
in aid of these efforts, and a situation where the debtor engages the court
only to defer liquidation without any real prospect of devising a business
plan acceptable to creditors. In such cases, it is reasonable for a court to
determine that a stay is not appropriate, that the debtor has been untimely
in the application, and that the court will not exercise its discretion to grant
the stay. Super-priority financing is then no longer an issue, and creditors'
interests are fully protected. Similarly, in considering whether to extend
the stay or a consideration of additional requests for DIP financing, a
court should be rigorous in assessing the timeliness of the request. It must
determine whether there is a possibility of achieving a plan such that the
176. Ibid.; Canadian Red Cross, supra note 29.
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debtor should be afforded the continued protection of the stay, any
priority financing, and the continued temporary suspension of creditors'
enforcement rights.
4. Balancing the Prejudice to All Stakeholders
Where equitable remedies are being granted, a court must balance the
specific relief against the burden of that form of relief to other parties.'77
That is precisely .the principle that Canadian courts have applied to
requests for priority and DIP financing. The court considers the amount
of relief sought, the relative amount of burden on secured and other
creditors in terms of the overall debt, the prospect of devising a feasible
business plan in a short time frame, the risks to employment, the risk of
firm failure to the local economy, any remaining equity interest of
shareholders, and a variety of other considerations. If specific relief
advances the statutory objectives and protects a variety of investments
and interests in the corporation, and in balancing that, the overall
prejudice to secured creditors is small, then the court will exercise its
discretion to grant priority financing.
Review of the courts' decisions indicates that the threshold for
granting financing for monitors' fees has been lower than that of DIP
financing for continued operations. This is because the courts have
consistently recognized that the monitor is acting to protect the interests
of all creditors. The courts have held that where it is appropriate to grant
an initial stay, the role of the monitor is both mandatory under the CCAA
and is key to facilitating a timely, informed and successful process to
develop and negotiate a plan of arrangement or compromise. Thus it will
grant orders creating a priority charge for the reasonable fees and
disbursements of the monitor. The court will also grant such priority
charges for representative counsel of employees, pensioners or consum-
ers, or charges in favour of other professionals where it is satisfied that
such financing is essential to the CCAA process.
The courts have generally set a higher threshold for DIP financing
aimed at ongoing operations. Here, in balancing the interests and prejudices,
the parties will consider the quantum of relief and expected benefits, as
well as the amount of prejudice to secured creditors. A court will consider
whether there is an urgent need for the financing to perform environmental
maintenance or "keep the lights on" for a brief period while the debtor
seeks additional financing or investment. 7 ' In balancing the prejudice, a
judge will also consider the likely gains for stakeholders if there is a
177. Waddams, supra note 76 at 521.
178. Re Royal Oak Mines, supra note 98.
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successful restructuring. 179 The courts have held that where the debtor
corporation can establish that this is a necessary requirement for the
formulation of a plan, or that it is reasonably important to maintain
operations to protect diverse interests and preserve the value of the
corporation in order to devise a successful turnaround plan, the court may
exercise its discretion to order the DIPfinancing.10 In this, the courts will
consider any erosion and the rate of erosion of secured creditors' interests
and are unlikely to grant the financing where it would be too prejudicial
to their interests. Judges will require cogent evidence that the benefit of
DIP financing clearly outweighs the potential prejudice to secured
creditors.18" ' Where creditors have a high level of distrust or lack of
confidence in the directors and officers, the court will not order such
financing. 12
5. Extraordinary Remedy
The clearest principle enunciated frequently by the courts is that DIP
financing is an extraordinary remedy and is available only in limited
amounts for a very brief, but realistic, period in the workout process. As
with equitable remedies generally, the exercise of this discretion has been
aimed at ensuring fairness in the process, and aimed at ensuring the
substantive objectives of the CCAA are met. Firm judicial control over
amounts of financing, over the precise purposes and use of such funding,
and over the accountability of the debtor to the monitor and the court,
ensures that this remedy does not undermine or exceed the purpose of the
CCAA. It also ensures that this extraordinary remedy does not conflict
with or undermine the purposes of the BIA should the workout fail and the
parties enforce their remedies under the bankruptcy regime.
The argument that there is a need for certainty in credit transactions is
an important one. However, secured creditors already take account of the
risk of insolvency in their credit decisions. Given the existence of DIP
financing and administration charges for the past fifteen years, secured
lenders arguably already take account of these costs in their credit
decisions. In addition, in some circumstances, secured creditors will
suffer no loss or may even realize a greater amount of their claim as a
179. Re Skydome, supra note 55; Royal Oak Mines, supra note 66.
180. Re Dylex, supra note 29.
181. Re United Used Auto (B.C. S.C.), supra note 73; see also Re Sharp-Rite Technologies,
[2000] B.C.J. No. 135 (S.C.), online: QL (BCJ).
182. General Electric Capital Canada v. Euro United Corp. (24 December 1999), Toronto
99-CL-3592 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Blair J..
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result of a successful restructuring plan, than they would have been able
to realize on a liquidation.
6. Are Statutory Guidelines Necessary?
The above-cited principles illustrate that Canadian courts have devel-
oped guidelines that have fostered certainty in credit transactions and
proceedings under the CCAA. Recently, however, some practitioners
have suggested that there should be statutory guidance. These range from
those who advocate that there is currently no jurisdiction absent statutory
amendment,183 to those who believe that the court has jurisdiction, but
that it could be enhanced by statutory guidelines.'84
Some practitioners have expressed concern that the courts' practice of
weighing the prejudice has somehow created uncertainty in the decision
making on DIP financing. Yet the entire process under the CCAA is one
of weighing the relative interests and prejudices to stakeholders, from the
initial order to the fairness inquiry on the sanctioning of a plan, and
numerous interim matters. While legislation could specify that the courts
must respect the rights of both debtors and creditors, that is precisely the
exercise engaged in by the courts now.
While it is true that legislative amendment would give direction and
certainty to parties in their consideration of whether to endorse requests
for DIP financing, it has the danger of unduly binding the court. One of
the underlying reasons for the CCAA was to facilitate compromises and
arrangements. Its flexibility has allowed parties to craft plans of
arrangement that are creative and have a high probability of success. 18 5
Moreover, if legislation only allows DIP financing where secured creditors
agree, as an example, then creditors will be given an effective veto over
the workout process. This will have serious negative consequences for
employees, trade suppliers and other unsecured creditors, who already
have the least bargaining power in the workout process. Such a requirement
would undermine the objectives of the CCAA and run counter to the
thoughtful jurisprudence that has evolved over the past decade, and
which has tried to balance the diverse interests of all stakeholders in the
workout process.
Rotsztain suggests that there should be introduction of statutory
amendments on DIP financing to give both procedural and substantive
guidance, but that the rules should not be so extensive or rigid that the
advantages of the current flexible regime are lost. 86 The codification that
183. See for example, Motion Record in United Used Auto, supra note 132.
184. Rotsztain, supra note 2 at 290.
185. See for example, Algoma Steel, supra note 36; Canadian Red Cross, supra note 29.
186. Rotszain, supra note 2.
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he advocates is essentially the approach already applied by the courts and
described above: notice, disclosure, preservation of assets for all creditors,
time for stakeholders to prepare a plan to avoid the social and economic
consequences of bankruptcy. 8 7 One issue not discussed above is where
the debtor satisfies the court that the borrowed funds are to be used to pay
amounts that enjoy legal priority over the interests of existing secured
creditors, where the payments would not materially prejudice the debtor's
assets or business.188 Rotsztain suggests that all of these grounds may be
so compelling that the debtor corporation would not need to justify
adequate protection for creditors, and that creditors would still be able to
oppose such funding and ask the court not to exercise its discretion. 189
While this codification might create greater certainty, it reflects
precisely what the courts are doing now, using the flexibility of the
process to ensure a proper balancing of creditor and other stakeholder
interests. It is worth noting that in the current debate about whether DIP
financing should be the subject of statutory amendment, there are no
cases cited in which the courts have failed to exercise their discretion
reasonably and in a restrained manner. Thus it is unclear why statutory
amendment is required.
Having made that observation, one factor the courts could first
consider is whether there is any equity remaining in the corporation. In
such cases, they could require that shareholders secure the DIP financing
against that equity. This would mandate an early determination of the
value of the assets and may lead to unnecessary expense and delay in the
process. The American system of costly and time consuming valuation
has highlighted this problem. However, there may be compelling reasons
for a court finding that, in order to continue the workout process,
shareholders must demonstrate their confidence in the future of the
corporation by risking some or all of the remaining equity investment.
This is quite different from requiring shareholders to add additional
capital and risk equity beyond their original investment decisions. It
could be part of the balancing that courts currently engage in when
considering whether or not to grant priority financing.
Both the CCAA and the BIA specify that bankruptcy and insolvency
legislation is to be reviewed by a parliamentary review committee in the
spring of 2002.190 The federal government has announced that the issue
of debtor-in-possession financing is an area in which it will consider
legislating. In a recently issued consultation paper, Industry Canada has
187. Ibid. at 291.
188. Ibid. at 292.
189. Ibid. at 293.
190. BIA, supra note 2, s. 216(l),(2); CCAA, supra note 1, s. 22(1),(2).
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suggested that codification of the courts' jurisdiction to order DIP
financing may create greater certainty in credit decisions.19' The paper is
the first stage in a consultation process by the federal government that is
to take place in the fall of 2001. The paper suggests that the court's
granting of priority financing under the CCAA has had both efficiency
and fairness effects. It is efficiency enhancing in the sense of allowing
debtor corporations to overcome risk aversion of existing lenders and
allowing corporations with viable business plans to survive. Thus it is a
positive intervention in the marketplace. DIP financing can also be
efficiency reducing in that it creates uncertainty in initial lending deci-
sions if there is uncertainty in how the courts will exercise their jurisdic-
tion under the CCAA. 92 The fairness issue is one of balancing diverse
interests in the workout process, where the courts balance the interests of
wage earners, suppliers and local communities with those of senior
secured lenders.
The consultation paper offers several possible options for codification
of DIP financing, without making any particular recommendation this
early in the process. One possibility is that new creditors providing DIP
financing would be required to share on equal or proportional terms with
banks as senior lenders, in terms of priority in security over liquid assets,
based on a specified formula. 93 This approach has some merit in that it
prevents existing secured lenders from having an absolute veto on
financing to facilitate the reorganization, while protecting their priority
status. It would also encourage DIP lenders to advance credit, although
it would not be on a full priority basis. Such an approach may enhance
both the availability of work-out financing and initial lending decisions.
The consultation paper also suggests that "opting-out" may be legislated,
such that creditors, in initial lending decisions, could contract with debtor
corporations to opt-out of any statutory provisions that would allow for
DIP financing on insolvency. Such a statutory amendment may ultimately
work to defeat the availability of DIP financing during the workout
process, and thus lead to premature liquidations. Senior secured lenders,
who always have the bargaining power to secure such agreements, would
likely make opt-out clauses a standard provision in initial lending
contracts. Such an approach fails to address all of the information
asymmetries and bargaining power problems addressed above. It would
merely shift the veto of secured creditors to the initial lending stage, as
191. Industry Canada, Corporate Law Policy Development, "Efficiency and Fairness in
Business Insolvencies" (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2001) at 37.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid. at 39.
Debtor in Possession Financing: The Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts to Grant 383
Super-Priority Financing in CCAA Applications
opposed to the insolvency stage, to the detriment of the diverse stakehold-
ers that the granting of DIP financing is currently aimed at.
The federal consultation process will also consider whether to amal-
gamate the workout provisions of the BIA and the CCAA, either by
eliminating the CCAA entirely, moving it intact into the BIA, or crafting
an integrated reorganization section within the BIA.194 Aside from larger
and important public policy questions regarding the implications for
diverse stakeholders in this question, there are also implications for DIP
financing. An amalgamation of the reorganization provisions could lead
to removal of the court's jurisdiction to grant DIP financing, given the
highly codified requirements of the BIA and the lack of certainty as to
whether the courts can currently grant such financing under the BIA.
Secondly, the ability of the courts to supervise the parties under the CCAA
in a flexible and highly creative manner may be lost with an amalgamation
of the statutes, including the ability to supervise priority financing that
balances diverse interests at risk with the insolvent corporation. Third, it
may be difficult to recognize and reconcile the differing rehabilitative and
liquidation objectives of the statute if the CCAA and BIA are amalgamated.
These issues must be carefully considered in the upcoming policy debates
regarding the future of the CCAA.
Rotsztain does offer a valuable suggestion with respect to the judicial
approach to extensions to initial financing. He suggests that statutory
guidelines could direct a court to exercise its discretion in the same
manner as now provided for in granting extensions to the initial stay under
the CCAA, specifically, that the court would not make an order for
additional DIP financing unless the debtor satisfies the judge that
circumstances exist that make the order appropriate and further satisfies
the court that it has acted and continues to act in good faith and with due
diligence.195 Although such a codification would give clear direction to
a court, it is also a test that could be applied under the current statutory
scheme.
Thus codification could be helpful, but is unnecessary. My concern is
that many of those advocating legislative change do not want to codify the
existing principles applied by courts. Rather, they want to create a secured
creditor veto in the workout process, as discussed in Part IV above.
Should Parliament decide that some statutory codification is required, it
should be cognizant of the fact that granting a de facto veto to secured
creditors would unfairly tip the balance of interests under the legislation,
to the detriment of those creditors who are already the most vulnerable in
194. Ibid. at 43-47.
195. Rotszain, supra note 2, at 293, citing supra note 1, s. 11(6).
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the process, such as employees, trade suppliers, consumers and tort
claimants. As a consequence, any statutory amendment should be aimed
at codifying the principles already being applied by judges, specifically:
notice, adequate disclosure to stakeholders in order for them to determine
their position on the DIP financing request, requirement of timely
requests for financing, and recognition of the need for the court to balance
the interests of all stakeholders affected by the insolvency of the debtor
corporation.
Conclusion
The degree of uncertainty created by the courts' granting of DIP financing
in its various forms may have been exaggerated. In addition, whatever
uncertainty remains must be balanced against the need to provide such
financing, in appropriate circumstances, in order to further and realize the
aims of the CCAA in protecting the interests of all creditors and the public
interests in the continued operation of corporations where the prospects
of successful reorganization exist. The need for certainty in the workout
period may require not statutory amendment, but, rather a clear articula-
tion of the principles on which the court is making its decisions. As noted
above, courts have gone a long way towards creating this certainty in their
judgments.
